

THE MEANING OF HITLERISM

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

IN the early months of 1934 the publication, under the title of *Hitler: Whence and Whither?*, of material from which I had drawn the substance of a course of University lectures, found so much favour that I was encouraged to continue the analysis of Nazi doctrines in a further course delivered at King's College last May. These lectures, entitled *The Clash of Ideas in Central Europe*, dealt mainly with the philosophical origins of Bolshevism, Fascism, and Nazism; and, by way of contrast, compared them with the liberal philosophy which inspired President Masaryk in his making of the Czechoslovak State.

After these lectures had been given, the wish was widely expressed that, notwithstanding their unavoidably abstruse character, they too might form the basis of a book. The gist of them will be found in these chapters. But I must confess that the concluding chapter, on "Responsible Freedom," seems to me the main warrant both for the lectures themselves and for the present volume. To-day few things are more important than to re-state liberal principles—of course, in a sense wholly de-

tached from party politics—and to seek foundations for a liberal faith that may commend itself to modern minds. To this end it is necessary to make some enquiry into the philosophy of unfreedom and to ask why, in so many countries, it has come to prevail over the philosophy of freedom. If “the price of freedom is eternal vigilance,” the dangers that threaten it in the realm of thought need to be watched as closely as those that appear to be more direct and tangible. Hence the semi-philosophical approach to my subject.

Still, facts “butt in,” and cannot be denied admittance. If, since these lectures were delivered, the turn of events in Germany has borne out many of the views which I put forward in them and in my earlier book, it has also stimulated reflection on the meaning of the events themselves. To examine their meaning in the text of the present volume, re-writing it so as to take account of later occurrences, would be to distort the original process of reasoning and to bolster it up by “wisdom after the event.” Therefore the text corresponds as closely to the form in which my ideas were at first expressed as the change from the spoken to the written word permits.

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To subsequent events I shall now briefly refer.

* * *

The murderous "clean-up" in Germany during the week-end June 30—July 1, 1934, shocked public feeling in Great Britain and elsewhere more seriously than any intellectual exposure of Hitlerism could have done. Though rumours had spread that not all was well in the Nazi ranks, the sudden slaughtering of so many of Hitler's intimate associates and lieutenants—to say nothing of the deliberate shooting of General von Schleicher and his wife and, apparently, of other prominent German officers—startled the world into asking how the "Third Empire" would treat foreign enemies if its leaders were capable of destroying overnight both their own comrades and other Germans suspected of disaffection. It is true that in well-informed quarters doubts were already felt whether some of the Nazi leaders could be looked upon as men of normal mental stability. A few days before the "clean-up," the behaviour of General Goering, in the costumes of Parsifal and Lohengrin, at a garden party to which he had invited the members of the Berlin Diplomatic Corps and their ladies,

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caused more than one foreign government, to which his performances were confidentially reported, to wonder whether Germany were not in the hands of lunatics. For the "garden party" turned out to be something between the proceedings at a stud farm and a display of theatrical charioteering. Then, in swift succession to the "clean-up," came the Hitlerite plot to seize the Austrian Government, and the murder—pre-announced by a Nazi photographic agency—of the Austrian Chancellor, Dr. Dollfuss, on July 25th.

For some days Europe seemed to be standing on the brink of war. Signor Mussolini, alarmed by an outrage in which the Nazi Chancellor—who had been his guest not long before at Venice—was evidently implicated, and even more perturbed by the proof that a comparatively small number of resolute fanatics could enter government buildings and slay the head of an Administration, threatened to send Italian forces into Austria should there be further assaults upon Austrian independence. Fortunately for the peace of Europe, Herr Hitler "backed down"; and within a few days the death of President von Hindenburg enabled him to assume supreme power in Germany, as Leader and Chancellor, and to take over the

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functions of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of Germany on the morrow, not to say on the eve, of the presidential demise. A referendum in which, it is true, some five million Germans found the courage not to approve of these arrangements, speedily confirmed Herr Hitler in his new position and provided him and his colleagues with one of those spectacular occasions which they need at intervals in order to impress the imagination of the German masses.

* * *

Events like these cannot be ignored in any appraisal of absolutism as a doctrine of State, totalitarian or other. Nor is it possible to overlook the financial and economic conditions in Germany, or the—to my mind, incautious—forecasts that, under stress of these conditions, Hitlerism itself is likely to collapse in the not distant future. Too much has been made by economists, from Karl Marx onwards, of material circumstances as decisive political factors; and too little heed has been paid to the “time-lag” between cause and effect, and to the part which emotions may play, especially when emotions are worked up to the point of

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passion or are linked with some persistent mania.

Before passing judgment upon contemporary or, for that matter, historical phenomena of this kind, it is always well to try to understand them. Nothing made a deeper impression upon competent observers in Germany during the summer of this year than the indifference, not to say the complacency, with which Nazi bloodshed and violence were looked upon by the bulk of the German people themselves. While the standing of Hitler and Hitlerism in the eyes of the outside world suffered severely, there is no evidence that it was affected within Germany to anything like the same degree; nor is it certain or even probable that financial and economic distress, or undeniable proof of incapacity to improve the general lot of the German masses, would weaken in notable measure Hitler's hold upon his people.

How widely the Nazi interpretation of Hitler's "clean-up" differed from the impression it made upon Western countries, may be judged by the panegyric which appeared in the second largest Nazi newspaper, the *Westdeutscher Beobachter*, on July 1st. It ran:—

A parallel case is not to be found in the whole of history! Never before has a leader submerged his

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personal feelings so completely, never before has there been a statesman so utterly concerned for the welfare of the nation, as the Leader. Neither Alexander the Great, nor any other Emperor or King in ancient history, neither Bonaparte nor Frederick the Great has done anything like it. Superhuman leadership, such as we have just witnessed, can surely never be repeated. One needs to have followed the Leader for years as we have done, have felt the spirit of the movement pulsing through our veins, in order to appreciate the immensity of his sacrifice; to understand what it meant to him to order so many of his old friends, many of them men with splendid pasts, to be shot. We stand in awe of this man and his unexampled self-sacrifice. In this solemn and tense moment we swear that we also will forgo all human weaknesses and errors. The blood that was shed yesterday will purify all of us; it is the sacrifice, which we dedicate to fate, necessary to keep our magnificent movement pure.

Recent visitors to Germany testify that this view of his action is not uncommon among ordinary folk in Germany. If this be so, if Hitler's ascendancy is based upon other than material considerations, the explanation must be sought in the realm of what Bismarck used to call "imponderables." And here I have a notion that, in the past history of Germany, something akin to a parallel may be found to the present state of German minds, a parallel

or precedent which may render German psychology more intelligible to non-Germans, and lead them to take a less superficial view of the present and perhaps of the future.

* * *

In the third chapter of *Hitler: Whence and Whither?* under the title "Mass Suggestion and Persecution Mania," I explained that when Hitler made up his mind to become a politician he resolved, in effect, to find ways and means of transmitting to others the species of persecution mania from which he had long been suffering as a member of the German race in Austria. This mania began in the overheated Austrian atmosphere of his boyhood and youth, and was aggravated by the downfall of Germany at the end of the war. A morbid temperament, nervous to the point of hysteria, and a fevered imagination led him to dramatise himself as the heaven-sent saviour of his people, a man with a divine mission. The power of mass suggestion, which he afterwards developed to a high pitch of efficiency, was already latent in him; and for the exercise of this power he possessed the indispensable quality of self-persuasion, or auto-suggestion, to the point of self-hypnosis.

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His mind was governed by the fixed idea that Jews, Socialists, and believers in Parliamentary democracy were engaged in nefarious persecution of the German race, and that, in seeking to put an end to this persecution, with the needful violence and brutality, he would be doing the work of the Lord. His mood of pathological exasperation had been heightened by his experience at the front, by his wounds and the effects of being gassed, and especially by the defeatist temper of his comrades in hospital; and it was in this condition of chronic nervous and mental exaltation that he established contact with the German masses which, as Mr. Edgar Mowrer shrewdly noted¹ were suffering from a wounded vanity that caused them to deny reality in the form of their own war responsibility and defeat, and to yearn for a liberator who should free them from their self-engendered obsession of inferiority.

Is there in German history any precedent for so remarkable a state of things? It is certainly not to be found in the years between the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon at Jena in 1806 and the battle of Leipzig in 1813. However perfervid may have been Fichte's appeal "An

¹ *Germany Puts the Clock Back.*

mein Volk," there was nothing morbid about it, nor was the work of Ritter vom Stein or Hardenberg marked by aught save sober patriotic determination and sustained energy. The preparations for the "Wars of Liberation" at the beginning of the nineteenth century offer no true parallel to the Hitlerite movement, though the memory of them may have inspired the creators of the Reichswehr. The only analogy to Nazi exaltation that I can think of is suggested by the little-known story of the Anabaptist "Kingdom of God in Münster" in the sixteenth century. It was the direct result of persecution mania among the Anabaptists; and, if it be argued that no true analogy exists between mania brought on by real and frightful experience, and hysteria arising from a self-fostered idea of persecution, the answer is that the German people as a whole are not conscious that their hysteria is self-fostered and that, to this extent, they are as sincere in their belief that they were persecuted and downtrodden by their enemies after the Great War as were the Anabaptists in reacting against physical persecution.

The "inferiority complex" and the yearning for a deliverer, which prevailed in Germany after the war, account in large measure for the

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readiness with which the German people succumbed to Hitlerite propaganda, and for the ecstasy with which they greeted Hitler's advent to power in January 1933. The circumstance that the Social Democratic founders of the Weimar Republic failed to take any reasonable steps to ensure the permanence of their system affects the psychological aspects of the problem just as little as it is affected by the errors of Allied policy. In truth the "Men of Weimar" succumbed to, or made no serious effort to discredit, the specious plea that Germany, guiltless of all responsibility for the war, had been and was being victimised and persecuted by relentless foes. As one of them has since admitted: "We were obsessed by the idea of revenge."

* * *

The story of "The Kingdom of God in Münster" is worth retelling for the light it may throw upon the atmosphere in Germany to-day. Professor Karl Pearson told it learnedly in the *Modern Review* for 1884, and reprinted it later in his *Ethic of Free Thought*; and it is from his sympathetic account that I summarise its main features:—

After the Lutheran Reformation, the German

peasantry, whose former freedom a brutal and ignorant nobility had transformed into galling serfdom, believed that a brighter day was about to dawn. In the towns the craftsmen, seeing their independence destroyed by the moneyed classes with a mad craving for wealth, shared this belief. Luther, the son of a peasant, with his "pure gospel," had defied the Roman Church, boldly facing indolent priests and tyrannical princes. The people hailed him as a national deliverer and, for a time, looked upon him as a god. Little by little they were undeceived. No new earth, with bread for all, appeared beneath Luther's new heaven. Then, late in the first quarter of the sixteenth century, the peasants banded themselves together, taking as their password the "pure gospel" and, mindful of their wrongs, sought vengeance upon their oppressors. Luther turned savagely against them. He declared that "there is nothing more poisonous, more harmful, more devilish than a rebellious man" and ordained that whoso should first slaughter such a man would do right well. Therefore he exhorted all who could do so, openly or secretly, to smite, slay, and stab the rebels.

His counsel was heeded. Peasants were slaughtered by the thousand—racked, flayed

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alive, burnt and tortured with every refinement of agony. The rebellion was crushed; but the longings of the masses for new spiritual leadership could not be extinguished. Thus the Anabaptists arose, teaching that, since a man must be born again for his salvation, so he must be baptised anew to mark his passage from the old world of sin to the new world of love. Men must have all things in common—community of earthly goods and a future without usury (Hitler's original programme called usury "servitude to interest") or tax. Patience should be their sole weapon and, should brotherly remonstrance not suffice, expulsion from the community the only form of punishment. Besides re-baptism their one ceremony was that of bread-breaking, a reminder that all were brothers and sisters in Christ.

In Anabaptism Luther saw a direct agency of hell. Zwingli, too, began to fear for the Swiss Church, and to talk of exterminating the heretics. Soon, throughout Switzerland, the Anabaptists were banished or suppressed. But banishment drove them all over Southern Germany, from Strassburg to the Tyrol, and persecution set in. It began in the Catholic districts. More than a thousand persons were

put to death for Anabaptism in the Tyrol during 1531. At Linz alone seventy-three were executed in six weeks. Duke William of Bavaria ordered that those who recanted should be merely beheaded while the stiff-necked should be burnt.

Soon the Lutheran Evangelicals joined in the chase. The Anabaptists were declared political offenders. Beheaded in Saxony, drowned elsewhere, torn in pieces with red-hot pincers and then burnt at Rothenburg, they were free game for every heresy-hunter. At Salzburg women and girls were dragged to the horse-pond, held under water till they were drowned, and their bodies thrown into the flames. The houses where Anabaptists had met were destroyed. Yet such was the intensity of their faith that men, women, and even children went boldly to the stake chanting Psalms.

At length flesh and blood could no longer endure the persecution. Driven wild by cruelty and fired with a passion for vengeance, the Anabaptists turned on their tormentors. Such horrors, they believed, could only precede the Day of Judgment. Their leaders having been slaughtered, each little community went its own way. Some instituted polygamy; some,

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believing themselves divinely free, made liberty the excuse for licence. These found their prophet in Melchior Hoffmann, a Swabian, a disciple of Luther until the persecution of the Anabaptists turned his head and made him half-mystic, half-madman. His pupils, the prophets of Leyden in Holland—Holland and Westphalia were soon covered by a network of Anabaptist communities—won a strong foothold at Münster in Westphalia whither Anabaptists were bidden to take refuge from persecution in Holland. Thus they congregated at Münster early in 1534, women and children, peasants, nobles, traders, craftsmen, monks, and nuns all bent on establishing the rule of righteousness and love—the Kingdom of God in Münster.

Here Jan Mathys, a baker of Haarlem, and his disciple, Jan Brockleson, made themselves masters of a theocracy which soon became a whirlpool of fanaticism, sensuality and despair. They drove out the Prince-Bishop and his forces, and gave way to wild vandalism. In revenge the Prince-Bishop drowned five Anabaptist women at Wolbeck and burned another five at Bevergem. Thereupon the Anabaptist "saints" grew mad in their fancies and madder in their deeds. Doubters and cavillers were put

to death, struck down by the "Sword of Righteousness." Jan Mathys, the arch-prophet, issued forth to challenge the forces of the Prince-Bishop, and was promptly slain. Jan of Leyden, who succeeded him, preached polygamy and set the example by taking fourteen wives.

A Dutch force, recruited by the Prince-Bishop, attempted to capture the city. It was defeated, and one hundred and twenty prisoners were butchered in batches of ten. As the siege grew closer, and famine threatened the "saints," the Prince-Bishop's troops tried again to take the place by storm, and were heavily defeated. Inside the city the rule of communism in all things was more strictly enforced, and fanaticism grew as hunger became more fierce. Day by day traitors were executed. At length, Jan of Leyden, seeing in a vision that he was called to be the new "King of Jerusalem," nay, King over the whole world, the Viceroy of God on earth, to rule over all princes, lords and potentates, attired himself in wondrous garb, clothed his chief lieutenants in brilliant uniforms and took his seat on the "Throne of Righteousness." Acute religious mania seized the whole community, none being more conspicuous than Knipperdollinch, the "King's"

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Chancellor. But at last, in the summer of 1535, two of the "saints" went over to the enemy, let the Prince-Bishop's soldiers enter the city where, despite the furious resistance of the starving fanatics, hundreds were slaughtered.

Jan of Leyden and Knipperdollinch were made prisoners and brought before the Prince-Bishop. "Art thou a King?" asked the Prince-Bishop mockingly. "Art thou a Bishop?" was Jan of Leyden's pungent reply. He and Knipperdollinch were sentenced to be shown round the Diocese in an iron cage and brought back to Münster where, with glowing pincers, their flesh should be torn from their bones till the death stroke was given with red-hot dagger in throat and heart. Then their remains should swing in iron cages from the tower of St. Lambert's Church. On January 26, 1536, Jan of Leyden and Knipperdollinch met their fate, his Grace the Prince-Bishop sitting on a lofty throne before their scaffold in the market-place, so as to miss no detail of his vengeance. The iron cages were hung on the church tower where they remain to this day.

* * *

So ended the Kingdom of God in Münster, a joint product of persecution mania and mystical

fanaticism. What may be the end of Hitler's "Third Empire," a joint product of artificial persecution mania and of semi-mystical fanaticism, no man can say. The "clean-up" of June 30, 1934, cost some 1,200 lives; and the reasons officially broadcast for the "execution" of Captain Roehm, the creator of Hitler's Brown Army, attested the revolting morals of some saints of Nazism. Heines, who perished likewise, was a notorious murderer. Goering, enamoured of dazzling uniforms and long addicted to drugs, who took a leading part in the "clean-up," is subject to fits of wild brutality; and the display of the Holy Roman Empire regalia behind the tribune from which Herr Hitler opened his Party Congress at Nuremberg on September 4th, may be a sign that the Leader-Chancellor has visions of lording it over princelings and expotentates in the garb of Emperor of the "Third Empire." His deputy, Herr Hess, greeted him there, in the name of German manhood and womanhood, as the restorer of manly virtue and womanly dignity in Germany, and as the giver of work to millions of idle men. "You have rehabilitated the lost honour of the German nation," he said. "You have revived the faith of the German people, and have laid

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the foundations for their future. . . . Your will is our command. You will be our pledge of victory and of peace." And Hitler himself proclaimed that the "Third Empire" would last a thousand years, and urged foreigners to "try to find the metaphysical roots of the Nazi movement."

Forestalling this Hitlerite injunction by some months, I tried last spring to find the metaphysical roots of the Nazi movement and to lay them bare. Tentative and inadequate though my effort was, its results have not been invalidated by what has happened since. Indeed, they may not be out of date while Hitlerism lasts—unless the Leader-Chancellor, yielding openly to the army, the Junkers and the big industrialists, should forswear, for the sake of power, the ideas that inspired, or were alleged to inspire, the earlier phases of his movement. Even then, as Mr. Edgar Mowrer recognised, "Hitler was in his heart a ferocious reactionary." But patent proof of his true quality might not now shake his hold upon the allegiance of his fellow countrymen. He assured them at Nuremberg that his original doctrine has not changed, and will not change, however adaptable his tactics may be. Without belittling the five million votes cast, directly and indirectly,

against his assumption of the functions of President, together with those of Chancellor, upon Hindenburg's death, or the widespread doubts whether Hindenburg's "Testament," bequeathing Hitler to the nation as the supreme warden of its destiny, be not apocryphal, it would not be safe to conclude that Hitler's hypnotic sway will therefore be weakened, or that financial disaster and economic distress would lessen the fanaticism of his followers.

In the early years, nay, throughout the reign of William II, there was no lack of grumblers and malcontents. This fact did not prevent him from leading his Empire into war with the support of a united nation in August 1914. Nor did the existence of a highly-organised and seemingly powerful Social Democratic opposition seriously curb his power. To-day all parties, save only the National Socialist, or Nazi Party, have been suppressed. Dr. Goebbels and his Propaganda Ministry are entrusted with sole power to give or to withhold information. There is no independent press, and the wireless is a Party instrument. Hitler, his Party and the armed forces, all members of which have solemnly sworn fealty to him, alone wield the weapons of established

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authority. And before established authority of any kind Germans are wont to bow.

Still, a canker gnaws at the heart of this mighty system of unfreedom. Like all popular dictators, Hitler is condemned, month in, month out, to focus attention on himself by some outstanding exploit or spectacle. His reign began with the burning of the Reichstag. It continued with the persecution of Jews, Liberals, Communists, Pacifists, and not a few Catholics. At a critical moment in October 1933 he aroused enthusiasm by a sudden decision to withdraw from the League of Nations. If his dearest wish, the conquest of Austria, has not yet been fulfilled, if it has cost him the support of his former mentor and present rival, the Italian "Duce" Mussolini, there are no grounds for supposing that he has lost hope or that he is not now planning a fresh attempt to unite the country of his birth with the country of his adoption, despite the risk that it may plunge Central Europe into war.

The other day I chanced to receive an extract from the report of a Cabinet Minister in the Government of a Great Power upon his recent conversation with a General on the active list of the German Reichswehr. This General said:—

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We do not want war, at least not for some years, but we are not in a position to prevent it. If tomorrow ten or twenty thousand venturesome fellows rush into the Saar or burst into Austria, we shall have to follow them. Then it will be war in spite of us. Here lies the danger both for you and for us, for we should lose all that we have built up with so much trouble.

I have good reason to know that more than one superior officer in the Reichswehr thinks thus, and believes that the peace of Europe hangs by a thread, the thread being at the mercy of Hitler's incalculable mental processes.

* * *

War, the long-talked-of "War of Liberation"—in reality, the war for German ascendancy—lies in the background of Hitler's thoughts and forms the steady purpose behind the façade of peaceful asseverations of which he is prodigal. Preparations for it are far advanced—preparations military and mechanical, aeronautical, chemical and bacteriological. A significant passage in the American edition of Dr. Helmut Klotz's recent volume *The Berlin Diaries*—a compilation of material supplied by Reichswehr officers, including the late General von Schleicher—throws light upon Hitler's outlook.

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Though this passage has been suppressed in the English edition, there appears to be the less reason for ignoring it since the allusion to it remains in Mr. Mowrer's Introduction to both editions. Under date January 10, 1933 (three weeks before President von Hindenburg appointed Hitler to the Chancellorship), the "diarist," a highly-placed officer of the Reichswehr, wrote:—

Herr Hitler, the energetic corporal, is keeping hard at it! From his election campaign in Lippe he has sent the Old Gentleman (President von Hindenburg) a memorandum in which he explains his views on the chances of a "bacteriological war" against France and Poland. The "basic idea" for such a war, which he anticipated would involve a radical revolution in "strategy and tactics," had been prepared for him by "his" department for the study of political and military technique. But he himself had carefully gone over their findings.

He had come to the conclusion that, when "it had beaten the enemy within its own gates," Germany must avail itself of this weapon so as to win "external freedom" as well. Technically, the bacteriological weapon was now perfect, and there could be no doubt that Germany would win a complete victory on both fronts within a very short time if it attacked unexpectedly and without a declaration of war and exploited the new method "to its uttermost consequences."

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He is quite right, our smart Adolf. . . . But we had already considered the question and come to similar conclusions. And that at a time when he was still content to work off his warlike complexes by haranguing public gatherings. All the same the memorandum is not without merit. At any rate it has made a great impression upon Hindenburg. And that of course was the intention of the whole performance.

In his Introduction to these *Diaries*, Mr. Mowrer says:—

Hitler and his associates esteem war as primitive men have always esteemed it. Somehow it seems to them identical with manliness. Furthermore, they despise internationalism and prefer to a civilisation they cannot understand an exclusive "racialism" that would subordinate all to Germans and their Nordic cousins. Their aim is territorial expansion, though they do their best to conceal this. In contemporary Europe such an aim can be realised only by fighting. Therefore, sooner or later, if he remains in power, Hitler must make war—provided the other nations do not, by combining, make the futility of war patent to him and his people.

This conclusion, based on Mr. Mowrer's exceptional experience and knowledge of post-war Germany, is borne out by the results of my own efforts "to find the metaphysical roots of the Nazi movement," as Herr Hitler now

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recommends non-Germans to do. The danger may be imminent or it may still be comparatively remote. But it is there and cannot be gainsaid by any conscientious student and observer. And one thing only can avert it—firm, open-eyed and well-prepared fidelity to the principles of liberal civilisation on the part of countries that still hold them dear, coupled with a settled resolve that war, the most illiberal, intolerant and irrational form of human enterprise, shall not be undertaken with impunity even by the strongest or the most warlike of peoples.

HITLER AND THE STATE
ABSOLUTE

CHAPTER I

HITLER AND THE STATE ABSOLUTE

IN *Hitler: Whence and Whither?* I made two assertions which have since appeared to me worthy of further enquiry and thought. One of them was that "the force of ideas is greater than any other force in the world, and that, unless ideas and their indwelling logic be understood in time, their practical manifestations may come as an often unpleasant surprise to those who leave that logic out of account."

The other assertion was that certain ideas common to Italian Fascism, German Nazism, and Russian Bolshevism challenge the very foundations of our Western liberal civilisation in so far as it is democratic and is based upon respect for individual rights and liberties. "Democracy," I added, "is not a system devised to assure the economic or social predominance of any one class. It is, at lowest, a form of mutual assurance against the curtailment of individual rights and liberties, its underlying assumption being that these rights and liberties, thus assured, shall be used in a spirit of self-devotion to the common weal."

The practice of true democracy demands personal sacrifice from those who engage in it. Thus interpreted, democracy is capable of a free efficiency which none of its foes can rival. If it be stoutly and worthily served, it may yet show the world a safer and a saner way out of its troubles than any violent substitute for individual freedom can offer."

The lines of cleavage or conflict between what, for want of a better name, may be called illiberal and liberal systems and tendencies are even more clearly marked to-day than they were six months ago, especially in Central Europe. If, in that region, Hitlerite Germany be taken as the main exponent of illiberalism, the republic of Czechoslovakia, over whose destinies the philosopher-statesman, President Masaryk, still happily presides, stands as the chief remaining representative of liberalism. It is in Central Europe that the clash of ideas is most apparent, though study of the underlying issues must raise questions of European and, indeed, of world-wide range.

These issues turn mainly upon the conception of the State. Taking first the "State Absolute" as it exists in Germany, I shall next describe the "State Liberal" as President Masaryk has defined it in his works and has actually brought it into being. Then, with the

ground thus cleared, I shall seek to examine the mysticism or the mythology of the Nazi faith, to indicate the forces ranged on either side in what is, in effect, a new and greater *Kulturkampf*, and finally to outline the rules of "responsible freedom." In the sphere of political thought no task seems to me more urgent than this; and though I cannot hope fully to succeed in it, my very failure may perhaps spur others on to do better until something in the nature of a new and dynamic political faith is evolved, such a faith, indeed, as millions of anxious and bewildered minds, especially among the young, are now waiting for.

* * *

Hitler's own conception of the State is not that of Hegel, who conceived the State Absolute as an end in itself. Rather does Hitler look upon the State as a means of attaining an end which he thinks absolutely good—an "absolute value" to use current philosophical jargon—the end being purity of race among Germanic "Aryans" who, in virtue of their innate superiority to other races, are entitled to rule the world. But, in practice, Hegel and Hitler are at one. Hitler's immediate aims are to put his party, and himself as its leader,

in unchallenged control of an absolute State, and then, through the instrumentality of the State, to establish a Third Reich or Empire which shall include all the Germanic or "Nordic" peoples of Western, Central, and Eastern Europe. While other prominent members of his party have expressed clearer and more dogmatic views upon the nature of the State than are to be found in Hitler's own book, *Mein Kampf*, or in his speeches, his chapter on "The State" contains several passages that, in point of frankness, leave little to be desired. Here are some of them, taken from the original German. The English edition is so poor a guide to his thought that I make no apology for citing him at some length:—

The fundamental principle is that the State is not an end but a means. It is not the cause of but a condition preliminary to the formation of a higher human civilisation (or culture). The cause consists exclusively in the existence of a race capable of culture. (Page 431.)

The State is a means to the end. The end is the preservation and fostering of a community of living beings who are physically and mentally alike. This preservation comprises, in the first place, the race as it exists, and permits of the free development of all the slumbering powers in this race. Of these a part will serve chiefly the maintenance of physical life; another part will serve intellectual develop-

ment though, in point of fact, the one is always the postulate of the other. States that do not serve this end are misconceptions, nay, abortions. The fact of their existence justifies them as little as the success of a robber band justifies robbery. (Pages 433-4.)

Yet, a page or two earlier, Hitler approves of robbery—though he might call it “sacred appropriation”—of others’ soil for German needs, provided there be no inter-mingling of robbers and robbed. He writes:—

That which has been usefully Germanised in the course of history was the soil our forefathers took by the sword and settled with German peasants. In so far as they brought, in this way, alien blood into the body of our people they contributed to the unhappy disintegration of our inner being, a disintegration that expresses itself in German super-individualism. (Page 430.)

Not the State but the character of a people capable of a higher human existence is the postulate of such an existence. (Pages 432-3.)

Thus the highest aim of a folk-State is care for the preservation of those original race elements which, as the dispensers of culture and civilisation, create the beauty and the dignity of a loftier mankind. We, as Aryans, can only conceive the State as the living organism of a folk-community, an organism that not only ensures the maintenance of this community but leads it to the highest freedom by the development of its intellectual and ideal capabilities. (Page 434.)

The goodness of a State cannot be judged by its level of culture or by the importance of its strength in relation to the rest of the world; it can be judged solely by the degree of the goodness of its institutions for its own people. . . . For it is not the task of a State to create capability but solely to clear the way for capabilities already present. Thus the State must be called bad if, despite the level of its civilisation and culture, its racial composition condemns the representatives of this culture to decline. . . . The State is form, not substance. Therefore a people's level of culture is not the standard by which the goodness of a State can be measured. Comprehensible though it be that a highly-civilised people should appear to be worthier than a negro tribe, the State organism of such a people, viewed from the standpoint of the attainment of its end, may be worse than that of negroes. (Pages 435-6.)

German inferiority to negroes in this respect was, it would seem, the reason why Germany lost the Great War. This inferiority may likewise have deprived mankind of a truly beneficent *Pax Germanica*:—

The German people lack that infallible herd-instinct which comes from unity of blood and, especially in moments of danger, saves nations from destruction in so far as it enables them to rise above petty inner differences and to show the firm front of a united herd to a common foe. What we call super-individualism comes from the presence (in our people) of unassimilated heterogeneous race

elements side by side with each other. In times of peace this state of things may even be of some service, but, taken as a whole, it cost us the mastery of the world. If, in its historical development, the German people had possessed the same herd-unity that stood other peoples in good stead, the German Empire would to-day be master of the globe. History would have taken another course; and who can say if this course would not have led to what so many purblind pacifists hope to get by whining and whimpering—a peace not supported by the tearful pacifist lamentations of palm-waving females but founded upon the victorious sword of a ruling race bending the world to the service of a higher *Kultur*. (Pages 437–8.)

Whoever talks of a mission of the German people on earth must know that this mission can consist only in the formation of a State which sees its highest task in the preservation and furtherance of the noblest undamaged elements of our folk and of all mankind. . . . As a State the German Reich must comprise all Germans with the object not only of gathering together and preserving what is most precious among the original racial elements of this people but of leading them slowly and surely upwards to a ruling position. (Page 439.)

So glorious a German destiny can only be fulfilled under the forceful leadership of a strong-willed minority using the State as its instrument:—

It is naturally easier to look upon the authority of the State as merely the formal mechanism of an

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organisation than as the sovereign embodiment of a people's instinct of self-preservation on this earth. For, in the one case, the State authority appears to the feeble-minded as an end in itself, whereas, in the other, it is only a mighty weapon in the service of the great eternal struggle for existence, a weapon before which each must bow because it is not formally mechanical but the expression of the common will to live. . . . And it must be quite clear that when, from among a people, a given sum of the highest energies and vigour of deed unites in pursuit of an aim, and so frees itself finally from the inertia of the broad masses, this small percentage rises to be lord over the whole. World-history is made by minorities when a minority embodies a majority of will-power and strength of decision. (Pages 440-1.)

* * *

These passages, written in 1924, give the key to Hitlerite practice. From them the steps taken during the past year to purge, by means of State action, all "non-Aryan" elements from the body of Germanism naturally follow. And if it be asked how such Hitlerite doctrine and subsequent practice became acceptable to Germany, the answer lies in their powerful appeal to racial self-esteem and in their promise that by the "Third Empire," or Reich, the "Aryan" German folk will not only be freed from servitude to persecuting foes, but will

be led upwards and onwards till it shall have secured its rightful place as ruler of the world. The gradual and pertinacious squeezing of the Jews out of the German nation, the prohibition of mixed marriages between Germans and Jews, the application of the "Aryan paragraph" to civil servants and professional men, including school teachers, and its retrospective extension to genealogies as far back as the end or, in the case of nobles, the middle of the eighteenth century, the discrimination against Jewish children in the German schools, and the ruthless crushing of all pacifist, socialist, and liberal persons and tendencies, are consistent fruits of Hitler's own philosophy of the State and of its purpose.

Did Hitler invent this philosophy or, at least, gather together its elements and fuse them into an original form, or were they already present in German minds, awaiting only the touch of a hand and the sound of a voice that should give them cohesion and rouse them to activity? As I showed in *Hitler: Whence and Whither?* his notions of the Nordic "Aryan" race and of the German people as its foremost representative were drawn from doctrines which Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and others had spread in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Simi-

larly, discussions and disputes upon the nature and the functions of the State had long been prominent features of intellectual and political life in German lands. Such discussions were usually related, directly or indirectly, to the theories of Hegel—which I propose presently to analyse and to expose. To these theories the materialist philosophy of Karl Marx, some of the ideas of Nietzsche and, at a later stage, the syndicalist views of Georges Sorel can be traced; and it was from Sorel that Mussolini took not a few of the conceptions that inspired Italian Fascism and its doctrine of the State Totalitarian or Absolute. From Italian Fascism, in its turn, Hitler borrowed something of his own theory and practice; but he drew far more from the beliefs and aspirations that were lurking obscurely in the deeper consciousness of the German people, as his own peculiar gifts enabled him intuitively to apprehend.

* * *

All great demagogues, and many popular orators of minor mould, have possessed the power to read the minds of the masses and to tell them, in more or less striking form, what the masses were unable adequately to express for themselves. This capacity may, indeed, be

indispensable in a popular leader. Hitler has it in marked degree, so marked that, in him, it becomes an almost trance-like receptivity coupled with a faculty to entrance those to whom his utterances are addressed. A book on *The German State*, which one of Hitler's early mentors, Herr Gottfried Feder, published in 1924, contains a passage, and that passage contains one word, which illumines the peculiarity of Hitler's mental powers as with a ray of light. It runs:—

Our demands upon a leader are extraordinarily high—passionate love of his people, an unbending will and a sureness of decision, amounting to sleep-walking surefootedness, must distinguish him. Obviously his mental powers must be above the average, though knowledge and abilities of the most various kinds are not the determining requisites. The knowledge and the cognitions of others can be made use of. Are there not many men of high learning, great clearness of thought, keen intuition and fine artistic gifts? But if they lack the one thing needful—the passionate will, the unerring inner urge grounded in the deepest moral earnestness—they will never stride ahead of their peoples as pathfinders and leaders towards new heights.

The one word in this passage is “sleep-walking.” Herr Feder's use of it indicates his belief that Hitler, his leader, possesses the

power to pick his way surefootedly, like a sleep-walker, and safely to tread where another, more wide-awake, might stumble or fall. In Hitler there is certainly some power of this sort; and its presence in him gives point to an episode which a German writer of repute recently related to me. Some years ago this German writer received from an English friend an autograph letter by Gladstone, as a historical and literary curiosity of some value. Soon after receiving it the German showed Gladstone's handwriting to a leading German graphologist justly famed for the accuracy of his judgments; and, in order to make the test severer, covered up Gladstone's address and signature. Fingering the letter delicately, and examining the writing with care, the graphologist exclaimed: "Highly interesting; a great statesman, a very great statesman; a wonderful orator, extremely eloquent and persuasive—yet, somehow, I should not quite trust him."

Lest this judgment strike us as lacking reverence for Gladstone's character, we may remember that not all his contemporaries, even among his own followers, looked upon him as a paragon of straightforward simplicity. Some of them were inclined to agree with the phrase in which that Radical iconoclast, Henry Labouchere (familiarily known as "Labby")

wickedly summed up his view of the "Grand Old Man": "All Prime Ministers keep an ace of trumps up their sleeves; but only Gladstone would have us believe that the Almighty put it there!"

Soon after the German graphologist had given his verdict upon Gladstone's handwriting, a specimen of Hitler's handwriting was shown to him. He scanned it rapidly and laid it down, almost contemptuously, saying: "It is the handwriting of a medium."

If this reading of Hitler's character be true—and it seems, on the whole, one of the shrewdest on record—it may help to explain his past career and many aspects of his present behaviour. Experienced observers who have attended his meetings, and have withstood his "spell-binding" sufficiently to retain the power of criticism, agree that he speaks like a man in a trance who is able to put others in an ecstatic, trance-like condition. And, as in several well-known cases of persons of mediumistic gifts, he falls into a state of exhaustion, which may last for hours, after his oratorical trances. The mere mention of certain words, such as "the Versailles Treaty" or "the Jews," is enough to make him rave and rant in apparent unconsciousness of his surroundings. In a normal state he appears insignificant.

Such a man may be, as millions of Germans hold him to be, the heaven-sent leader of a great people. On the other hand, he may simply be a medium through whom the obscure instincts, appetites, and aspirations of that people find dynamic and—inasmuch as his power to express them is now well-nigh absolute—dangerously explosive expression.

* * *

In *Hitler: Whence and Whither?* I gave some account of his upbringing and of his early struggles in Vienna. Since then an unknown correspondent has sent me a pamphlet purporting to reveal the life Hitler actually lived in the Austrian capital. It alleges that he had no home, or even a room, of his own, but slept regularly in an asylum, or shelter, for the homeless, and eked out a penurious existence by persuading another inmate of this shelter to hawk round picture postcards and other drawings which Hitler had made. The pamphlet reproduces an affidavit sworn by the inmate in question before a notary public in Vienna on November 13, 1933. According to it Hitler would rather suffer hunger than work at any trade more exacting than that of drawing or painting; nor, when a stroke of luck had brought him a little money from the

sale of his postcards or drawings, would he work again until the money had been spent in coffee houses and other places where he loved to harangue all who would listen to him. Many Jews befriended him, and he esteemed them as buyers of his sketches. In the summer of 1910 he saw a cinema film, called "The Tunnel," by Kellermann. It portrayed a popular orator working up a mass meeting to a high pitch of excitement, and becoming a tribune of the people. Wild with enthusiasm, Hitler there-upon determined to found a party himself. Dr. Lueger, the famous anti-Semitic Burgomaster of Vienna, had just died, and the Austrian Socialist Party was attacking his successor. Declaring that the Socialists were not a true working-class party, and that Dr. Lueger's anti-Semitic Christian Social Party would vanish, Hitler decided that the way was open for a new party which he sought to recruit among the inmates of the shelter. But by degrees he fell into such poverty that he had difficulty in keeping body and soul together. Therefore he welcomed a chance to leave Vienna for Munich early in 1913.

The aim of this pamphlet is obviously to run Hitler down by exhibiting him as a lazy ne'er-do-weel who would not even work seriously for his living. I draw from it other con-

clusions—that Hitler felt in himself the capacity to become a leader of the masses, that his gifts were undoubtedly of the artistic order, and that not even the spur of hunger could always drive him to put his physical needs before his political impulses and ambitions. The attempt to belittle the man strikes me rather as proof that his subsequent career was an almost continuous development of an inborn faculty for popular agitation. True, he found his opportunity in the neurasthenic condition into which defeat, revolution, and suffering had thrown the German masses after the war—masses who had been led into the war believing that the military might of the German State would give their country swift victory over “encircling” foes and the mastery of Europe. And it was precisely by reflecting the minds of the masses, by contrasting their actual misery with their former belief, by persuading them that they had been the victims of Marxist and Jewish treason, and by fostering new dreams of ultimate triumph over traitors and enemies at home and abroad, that Hitler gathered up into a series of persuasive catchwords all the confused notions which earlier agitators and writers, including the Marxists and the various prophets of pan-Germanism, had derived from

the philosopher, Hegel, and had left latent, as semi-conscious ruminations, in the depths of the German soul.

Whether Hitler has ever read a line of Hegel I do not know, nor does it greatly matter. But so many ingredients of the Marxist Socialism against which he reacted, and of the Italian Fascist and kindred German doctrines which he absorbed, must be traced back to the Hegelian conception of the State and of the relation of individuals to it, that it seems opportune to examine that conception and to look closely into its effects and implications. A critic of *Hitler: Whence and Whither?* has taxed me with having assigned more importance to Hegel than to his forerunner, Fichte. My answer is that Fichte is in many respects the antithesis of Hegel, for Fichte was a passionate advocate of individual freedom, whereas Hegel taught that all individual rights and liberties are absorbed by the State which he held to be the total embodiment of all morality. Despite Fichte's passionate faith in Germanic superiority, his love of freedom amounted to a religion.

As I have argued elsewhere, notably in a little book called *A Way to Social Peace*,¹ Hegel's deification of the State as the sole and total

¹ George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1934.

embodiment of morality is a contradiction in terms. The "totalitarian," absolute State cannot be moral because it is responsible to itself alone. It is like a man on a desert island. Such a man may be religious, but he cannot act morally because there is no one else on the island for him to treat morally or immorally. Similarly the Absolute State may do well or ill, from the standpoint of its own preservation, but it is unable to be moral, or to embody morality, since it takes no account of its obligations towards others. Now the obligations of individuals to each other are the essence of morality. Philosophically, the terms "moral" and "social" are interchangeable. They imply the existence of a community or society; and there is no such thing as a community or a society of one. The notion of an omnipotent, all-embracing, deified or totalitarian State is an affirmation of non-morality, that is to say, a negation of moral limitations, an over-riding of individual wills, and the reduction of individual freedom to the sole right and duty of obedience. Morality is a synonym for social limitations, for accepted restrictions upon absolute individual sovereignty. And this is why the inverted Hegelianism of Karl Marx, who preached the absolute dictatorship of the proletariat over

all other classes, and the direct Hegelianism of the Italian Fascist and Hitlerite ideas of the total and absolute State, are utterly unreconcilable with free and liberal civilisation which, in my view, is the only civilisation worthy of the name.

* * *

Those who may wish to go more deeply into this abstruse yet weighty matter cannot do better than read a remarkable work, *The Metaphysical Theory of the State*¹ by a British philosopher, the late Professor L. T. Hobhouse. The substance of it was delivered as a course of lectures at the London School of Economics in the autumn of 1917. The date is significant because it proves that Professor Hobhouse actually gave his lectures before Bolshevism obtained control in Russia at the end of 1917, and long before Fascism gained the upper hand in Italy during the autumn of 1922, or Hitlerism triumphed in Germany early in 1933. The more striking, therefore, is Professor Hobhouse's demonstration of the indwelling power of ideas, even though the ideas themselves be fallacious. He wrote:—

In older days we passed by the Hegelian exaltation of the State as the rhapsodical utterances of a metaphysical dreamer. It was a mistake. The whole

¹ George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1918.

conception is deeply interwoven with the most sinister developments in the history of Europe. It is fashionable to conceive German militarism as a product of the reaction against a beautiful sentimental idealism that reigned in the pre-Bismarckian era. Nothing could be more false. The political reaction began with Hegel, whose school has from first to last provided by far the most serious opposition to the democratic and humanitarian conceptions emanating from eighteenth-century France, sixteenth-century Holland, and seventeenth-century England. It was the Hegelian conception of the State which was designed to turn the edge of the principle of freedom by identifying freedom with law; of equality, by substituting the conception of discipline; of personality itself, by merging the individual in the State; of humanity, by erecting the State as the supreme and final form of human association.

Between Hegelian teaching and the ethics of Bismarck—which were non-ethical—the connection was direct; but, Professor Hobhouse points out, it is not in Germany alone that Hegelian influence has profoundly affected political development. It has permeated the British world, discrediting the principles which inspired liberal progress and, in particular, depreciating the ablest British and French contributions to political and social thought. As a fashionable academic philosophy, Professor Hobhouse continues:—

Genuine Hegelianism has revived, and the doctrine of the State as an incarnation of the Absolute, a super-personality which absorbs the real, living personality of men and women, has in many quarters achieved the position of an academic orthodoxy. For academic purposes, indeed, it is a convenient doctrine; its bed-rock conservatism is proof against all criticisms of the existing order. . . . It justifies that negation of the individual which the modern practice of government is daily emphasising. It sets the State above moral criticism, constitutes war a necessary incident in its existence, contemns humanity, and repudiates a Federation or League of Nations. In short, we see in it a theory admirably suited to the period of militancy and regimentation in which we find ourselves. The truth or falsity of such a theory is a matter of no small interest; indeed, it is not a question of theory alone but of a doctrine whose historical importance is written large in the events of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

These lines, let me repeat, were written a full year before the end of the War, and at a time when the establishment of a League of Nations seemed to most people a pious aspiration. Neither the Allied victory, which enabled President Wilson to insist that the constitution of the League must be the first point on the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference, nor the subsequent hostility of militarist Japan, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany to the League could then be foreseen. Since

Professor Hobhouse wrote, events seem to have conspired together to vindicate his foresight and to reveal the pernicious quality of the Hegelian theory. To-day, more than ever, it is essential that we should understand exactly where the falsity of this theory lies, for by true ideas alone can false ideas be vanquished.

* * *

Hegel's theory of the State is an endeavour to exhibit the fabric of society as an expression of that Supreme Being which some call God, some the Universal Spirit, others the Absolute. In his eyes the State is a working model of the Absolute, an embodiment of the "Idea" which is the reality behind phenomena. For the thorough-going "idealist"—in the Hegelian sense—the conscious beings who live under the shadow of the Absolute have just as much or as little title to independent consideration as the cells of the human body. "The State," he says in his *Philosophy of History*, "is the divine idea as it exists on earth"; for "all the worth which the human being possesses, all spiritual reality, he possesses only through the State." And in his *Philosophie des Rechts*—not to be translated as the "Philosophy of Law," for the German term "Recht" is ambiguous—

he adds: "The State is the spirit which stands in the world and realises itself therein consciously. . . . The existence of the State is God's movement in the world." And again: "The State is the Divine will as the present spirit unfolding itself in the actual shape and organisation of a world." "It is the absolute power on earth." "It is an end in itself. It is the ultimate end which has the highest right against the individual, whose highest duty is to be a member of the State."

Now this theory is not ethical because it does not seek to find reasons for human conduct in any ultimate goal of human endeavour or in any rational principle of human duty. Nor is it scientific. It assumes certain conceptions and expounds them dogmatically in general terms, thrusting aside the appeal to experience. If actual societies differ from the "idealistic" conception of them, so much the worse for those societies. And Hegel crowns his conception by claiming that an individual is necessary, preferably a king or a monarch, to express the will and to "realise" the "personality of the State"; though between the monarch and the people he places a series of estates or corporations, not, indeed, as a check upon absolutism or as an expression of popular rights, but merely in

order to let the people know that it is being well governed. Hence the Fascist and the Hitlerite notion of the "Corporative State."

How did Hegel come to look upon these asseverations as the sublime truth? One answer may be that he was originally a theologian, with a theologian's knack of begging the question. Another answer is that he propounded his political views under the influence of the reactionary Prussian State of his time and in order to justify its doings. As Dr. Albert Schweigler, author of the well-known German *History of Philosophy*, pointed out more than fifty years ago, Hegel only won his reputation and attained prominence after his appointment in 1818 to the Chair of Philosophy at Berlin. "It was here," wrote Dr. Schweigler, "that he attracted a numerous, extensive, and scientifically very active school of adherents; and here, too, in particular, he gained for his philosophy the position of a philosophy of State through his connection with Prussian officialdom, and acquired political and administrative influence—neither of which was advantageous to the inner purity of his philosophy or to its moral credit." In fact, Hegel became the philosophical propagandist of a reactionary Prussian State-idea; and, without the support of Prussian officialdom, his views

would have been unlikely to enjoy much vogue. One need not accept all the invective with which Schopenhauer was wont to spice his denunciations of Hegel, or assume that Hegel's thought was consciously dishonest; but one cannot gainsay Schopenhauer's dictum that it is "really a sin, which deserves neither pardon nor palliation," to disorganise young minds with meaningless Hegelian phraseology. In sober truth, Hegel adapted his thought to the views of the Prussian bureaucracy and won influence upon his contemporaries, and through them upon posterity, as Schopenhauer says, "by his obsequiousness, on the one hand, and his impudence in writing nonsense, on the other."

* * *

Yet, in view of its consequences, we must look at this nonsense more closely. Like Italian Fascist and German Nazi nonsense to-day, it was a product of the prevailing spirit of the age in Prussia, Austria, and Central Europe generally. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the principle of authority, and especially the principle of Divine Right, had been challenged by many critics. The claims of individual conscience were upheld against the authority of the Church; and the

alleged "natural right" of individuals against the unlimited authority of Governments. The whole social structure was scrutinised from the standpoint of its efficiency in promoting individual happiness. A tendency arose to look behind institutions and laws to the human lives they affected, and to insist that the worth of institutions and forms of civilisation depends upon the quality of the human life which they foster. Sound though this tendency was, the exaggeration of it, in the French Revolution and elsewhere, gave Reaction its opportunity, and led to the formation of the Holy Alliance of which the obscurantist Metternichian system in Austria was the fullest expression. To the Prussian side of this Reaction Hegel's philosophy gave an academic and pretentiously intellectual warrant by setting up the State, with an absolute monarch at its head, as a super-personal entity to which individuals, with their private consciences or claims to rights, their happiness or their misery, were wholly subordinate.

True, Hegel made what he called "freedom" the starting point of his theory of the State, but his "freedom" turned out to be willing conformity with the dictates of the State itself. He claimed that it is false to look upon freedom negatively as equivalent to the absence of con-

straint, and that positive freedom lies in self-determination by freedom of will, free will being the will which wills to subordinate itself to the State. He goes a step farther in asserting that this freedom or self-determination of the will cannot be achieved by individuals on their own account. It needs to be "conditioned" by law and custom and finally expressed by the will of the State itself, the State being its own end, and the highest duty of the individual being faithful membership of the State. Beyond the State, Hegel insists, there is no higher human association, and States have no duties to one another or to humanity. Their rise and fall is a process of universal history before whose bar they ultimately come for final judgment.

* * *

Translated into modern terms this doctrine bears a singular resemblance to the theory and practice of Fascism and Hitlerism. Under this theory and practice there can be only one party, one leader, one will controlling and embodying all the resources of the State—including physical constraint and a monopoly of education—one press, one wireless, one economic system.

The distinction between Hegel's dictum

that the State is an end in itself, and Hitler's claim that it is merely a means to an end is, as I have said, more apparent than real, for Hitler argues that the State is the indispensable means of securing the purity of the Nordic "Aryan" Germanic race which, by its inborn virtue, is entitled to rule the world. Where Hegel puts a monarch, Hitler puts himself as the leader of a mythical race; but in both cases the result is much the same since, on its way to the achievement of race-purity and domination, the Nazi State, under its leader, is as absolute as the Hegelian.

The implications of these insidious doctrines are wide and deep. They release States from any obligation to act morally, inasmuch as they deny that there can be any community or society of nations circumscribing the actions of an individual State. Thus they deny that international relations can be governed by moral obligations or by valid international law. Logically they point to a struggle for domination between individual States until the stronger, or, as Hitler would put it, the racially worthier, prevails. For freedom or toleration, as things good in themselves, they leave no room. They ignore the truths that political and social freedom does not consist in like-mindedness but in the toleration of

differences within the framework of laws and customs freely accepted, and that the doctrine of freedom admits or even welcomes differences as contributing to a richer common life than uniformity can offer.

The claim of the free individual is not that the common decision or the common law shall be identical with his own wishes, but that his wishes shall be heard and be taken into some account. As Professor Hobhouse puts it, the individual "is free not because the social will is his own, but because he has as much scope for expression as any one man can have if all are to have it and yet live and act together. More than this is the beginning of tyranny, less is the beginning of slavery."

The problem of the present and the future, both in the national or social and in the international sphere, is how to secure as much freedom and scope for individual expression as may be compatible with the freedom of others. The alternative is the suppression of individual freedom by the force of the stronger. As I have said, the Hegelian, and Hitlerite, doctrine implies that individual States must struggle until the stronger prevails and imposes its will upon others; and, indeed, the history of Prussia in the nineteenth century showed that, in foreign policy at all events, the eleva-

tion of the State above men means the supremacy of power untrammelled by ethical considerations. This may be the natural creed of a ruling dynasty, bureaucracy, or aristocracy in an absolute State, whereas, in the liberal or democratic view, the sovereign State is destined to surrender something of its sovereignty by membership of a world-community, all members of that community being bound by moral obligations towards each other. In Hegel and Hitler alike we find war treated as an ethical factor. According to Hegel it is the means by which the State preserves its security; or, in Hitler's phrase, the means by which it founds peace "upon the victorious sword of a ruling race bending the world to the service of a higher civilisation." Mussolini, for his part, terms war "the Supreme Court of peoples" which delivers final judgment. "Appeal can be but another war."

Hegel was certainly consistent in repudiating Kant's humanitarian proposal for a League of Peace. He argued that, though States may make stipulations with each other, the State must at the same time stand above such stipulations or, in the modern phrase, behave as though treaties were scraps of paper. This, too, was Bismarckian doctrine. Hegel claims that the State must judge for itself

what it will treat as a matter of honour, especially when, after a long period of peace, it has to seek an occasion for activity beyond its borders. It need not wait for any actual injury. The idea of a threatening danger is enough. Preventive or anticipatory wars are therefore justified. They need not be waged for any philanthropic purpose, since the State has to think of its own well-being, and its well-being is superior to that of any individual, within its own confines or without.

* * *

These ideas of Hegel are unquestioningly accepted by Nazi Germany. It may be that Hitler himself is unaware of their genealogy. He professes to be the unrelenting foe of Marxism. Yet Marxism, too, was directly and indirectly derived from Hegel. Both Marx and Engels began as Hegelians, and Engels at least remained an Hegelian to the end—as he himself assured me in 1894. They adopted Hegel's famous dialectic—a complicated process of reasoning which undertakes to discover truth by affirmation, contradiction, and a contradiction of the contradiction which embraces and resolves both the affirmation and its denial. This process Marx and Engels followed; though, under the influence of

Feuerbach's philosophy, they inverted Hegel's metaphysic. He taught that the Ideal alone is the truly Real, and that the State-idea is the absolute political reality on earth. Marx and Engels, on the other hand, argued that, inasmuch as ideas are real, material facts are the truest ideas, and that men's thoughts and actions are determined by the facts of their material surroundings. Hence the materialistic interpretation of history, the doctrine of the class-struggle, and the claim that this struggle can only be ended by the absolute dictatorship of the proletariat in a Communist State. Moreover, as Mr. G. D. H. Cole points out in his recent book, *What Marx Really Meant*, one often feels in reading Marx's writings that "he regards the [proletarian] class as somehow more deeply real than the individuals who make it up—certainly as a more important influence on historical evolution." And Mr. Cole suggests in explanation that here "Marx sometimes seems to be playing dangerously—all the more so because half-consciously—with the Hegelian conception of degrees of reality."

From Marx and Engels, and from Nietzsche (who in some respects was a fierce critic of Hegel and agreed rather with Schopenhauer) the philosopher of syndicalism, Georges Sorel

derived the ideas which inspired Mussolini in the development of Italian Fascism. While following simultaneously Marx and Nietzsche, and resolving their contradictions by a dialectical method of which Hegel would doubtless have approved, Sorel discovered that they had, at least, a common enemy—the sovereignty of the middle class in control of the capitalist system. True aristocracies, he contended, reign by military virtue; and the working class, which Sorel regarded as the true modern aristocracy, must likewise prove its virtue by violence. It must cultivate, if only as a myth or object of faith, the idea of violence—of which a first expression must be the general strike. By organising this form of direct action the working class would find its true leaders; and working-class unions, or syndicates, would be instruments of aristocratic selection among the sons of toil. Presently Sorel went back to Hegel himself and, on the strength of Hegel's "nonsense," claimed that a governing system, or a State, must control the acts, the ideas, and the customs of men and, overcoming opposition, secure all right and power for itself. Absolute power, founded upon force, must be the goal and the sanction of syndicalism.

This was a doctrine which Mussolini felt

to be after his own heart, and upon it he based his system of *fasci*, or groups, and their creed of victorious violence. The Italian Fascist example worked powerfully upon Hitler, who, taking Mussolini as his model and gathering together intuitively the odds and ends of Hegelian and post-Hegelian notions that were dormant in German minds, developed the doctrines of Nazism. Thus, by devious ways, the two chief countries of Central Europe, Italy and Germany, were brought back to the feet of Hegel who had himself been the obsequious propagator of the Prussian State-idea. Truth to tell, there is little or nothing new in the whole farrago of pseudo-philosophical reasoning that has been set up as a final refutation of the philosophy and practice of ordered freedom which characterise Western liberal civilisation. Not even the Nazi theory of the innate superiority of a non-existent "Aryan" Germanic race is new or true. Reduced to their simplest expressions the Fascist and the Nazi conceptions of the State are merely modernised variants of semi-Oriental despotism. They are bombastic apotheoses of personal rule in the State illiberal.

MASARYK AND THE STATE
LIBERAL

CHAPTER II

MASARYK AND THE STATE LIBERAL

IT is hard for Englishmen, who pride themselves upon being practical, really to believe that abstruse ideas can shape actual events and fashion the lives of beings of flesh and blood. We are not in the habit of deducing rules of conduct from philosophic axioms or even of suiting the action to the word. Yet we may perceive that theoretical considerations do affect the lives of millions of people—and indirectly our own—and determine the course of their conduct for better or for worse. While it might be too much to say that the most practical man and the ablest statesman is he who thinks most truly, it is certainly wrong to look upon the rule of thumb, or the habit of taking things as they come, as the soundest workaday wisdom. Nowhere in the modern world has this been more clearly shown than in the achievements of a sane and responsible leader like President Masaryk, whose philosophical convictions enabled him to guide his own people from servitude into freedom and to create the chief if not the only exist-

ing example of the State liberal in Central Europe.

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But abstract thought is one thing and the application of it is another. Into the application there enters always a "personal equation." Just as the theories of Karl Marx, as applied in Soviet Russia, are scarcely intelligible apart from the personality of Lenin and, in some degree, of Trotsky; and just as an understanding of Italian Fascism requires that the character and temperament of Mussolini be taken into account, or those of Adolf Hitler in the case of German Nazism, so the establishment of the State liberal in Czechoslovakia cannot be rightly appraised without knowledge of the life and work of Thomas Garrigue Masaryk. Before setting forth the ideas for which he stood and stands, I shall, therefore, follow the method adopted in the case of Hitler and sketch, very briefly, Masaryk, the man, and his career.

Masaryk was born on March 7, 1850, at Hodonín, a Slovak town in the Austrian province of Moravia hard by the Hungarian border. Until the emancipation of the serfs in 1849, his father, a coachman on an Austrian

Imperial domain, had been a serf of the Hapsburg Emperors. Thus Thomas Masaryk narrowly escaped being born in serfdom; and, as he has placed on record in his conversations with the Czech writer, Karel Čapek, serfdom continued *de facto* on the Emperor's estates after 1849. His father had even to ask permission to send him to a secondary school. Masaryk adds: "Those [impressions of serfdom] were my first impressions of the social order: some official on the estate would be surly with my father, and I had to look out. I used often to wonder how I could pay them out for it and give them a good thrashing! When the 'lords and masters' came for the shooting, they would leave their fur coats at our house, and you have no idea how I longed to vent my childish rage on those fur coats."

Notwithstanding legal emancipation, Masaryk's father remained a serf all his life. He had never been to school. But his wife, Masaryk's mother, who had been a cook in a gentleman's family, was a woman of strong character and no little ability. To her desire that her children should profit by an education which had been denied to their parents he owed the beginnings of the deep knowledge which presently gave him a high rank among European philosophers.

From his mother, too, he took his religious temperament, his high principles, and his moral fearlessness. His ruling passion has always been love of the truth—positively in the form of true learning and accurate thought, negatively in the form of hating what is spurious and insincere. Brought up as a devout Roman Catholic, he became an apt and ardent pupil of his religious instructors; but he broke with one of them who made light of the obligations of confession, and actually left a secondary school rather than tolerate injustice. For a time he was apprenticed to a locksmith in Vienna, and then to a blacksmith on the Imperial estate at home; but a former teacher induced his parents to send him again to school so that he might prepare himself for the teaching profession. Still later he was admitted to a classical high school in Vienna where, by dint of thought and study, his outlook broadened until, at the age of twenty, he felt bound to reject the doctrine of Papal infallibility which the Vatican Council had just proclaimed. On this score he left the Roman Church; and after a period of association with the Uniate Church he was so influenced by the life and martyrdom of John Hus (Wyclif's disciple), by the records of the Bohemian

Brotherhood Church, and by the writings of Comenius the Educator, its last Bishop, that he accepted and professed an enlightened form of Protestantism. Little by little he was driven to conclude that the militant clericalism of the Hapsburgs, as a political expression of Roman intolerance, had been the inveterate foe of his people; and while eschewing any form of counter-intolerance, religious or political, he convinced himself that the redemption of the Czechs and Slovaks could not be achieved without a return on their part to the individual uprightness, the personal belief devoid of sacerdotal taint, which Hus and Comenius had taught and practised.

* * *

Closely entwined with his religious faith was his moral philosophy which he derived chiefly from Plato, though he read and assimilated the works of all the great philosophers, including those of Germany. In him religion and philosophy formed an indissoluble unit. But he held them of no avail unless they proved themselves truly moral by inspiring and guiding the conduct of men towards their fellow-men. For several years he was a reader and lecturer in philosophy and sociology at Vienna Uni-

versity, taking his degree with a thesis on "Suicide—as a Social Phenomenon"—until in 1882 he accepted an offer to go as a supernumerary, or extraordinary, Professor of Philosophy, with a small salary, to the resuscitated Czech University at Prague. A regular appointment to the Chair of Philosophy within three years was promised to him.

The promise was not kept. Before the three years were over he outraged the umbrageous patriotism of the Czech Nationalists by claiming, and proving, that certain "historical" manuscripts, which they cherished as evidence of early Czech culture, were, in reality, worthless forgeries. He was denounced as a rogue, and called a traitor to his people. Not even the scientific substantiation of his claim could dispel the odium he had incurred.

For this and other reasons his appointment to the Chair of Philosophy was long delayed. Some of his professorial colleagues opposed it, and the Lord Lieutenant of Bohemia reported to Vienna that he was a dangerous fellow, little better than a revolutionary. When, at last, his colleagues were unanimous in recommending that he be appointed, the Ministry of Education in Vienna "sat upon" their recommendation for more than four years. At length

a new Lord Lieutenant urged that the appointment be made, since Masaryk had become "quieter," although he still attended and spoke at working-class meetings. Scenting heresy, the Cardinal Archbishop of Prague hastened to assure the Emperor Francis Joseph that Masaryk was a Nihilist, a corrupter of youth, and an apologist for suicide. The Emperor asked the Minister of Education for a report upon so noxious a creature. It was drawn up on the strength of Masaryk's own writings; and, when the Cardinal Archbishop once more appeared before the Emperor to renew the earlier denunciation, the Emperor, observing that he himself was better informed, signed the necessary decree.

Thus on January 1, 1897, after waiting twelve years, Masaryk became Professor-in-Ordinary of Philosophy at the Czech University of Prague. Meanwhile he had drawn upon himself fresh hostility by opposing the unreasoning enthusiasm of the Czech Nationalists for everything Russian. Unlike them, he knew Russia and understood that pan-Slavism could bring no boon to his people. Behind it he detected Russian obscurantism and reaction.

Partly on this account and partly because he disliked the factious spirit of Czech party

politics, he resigned his membership of the Austrian Parliament—to which he had been elected in 1891—and devoted himself entirely to educational work and political writing. In 1899 the fiercest storm of his life broke over him. Against judicial injustice, popular fury, and clerical intolerance he defended a Jewish cobbler, named Hilsner, who had been unjustly convicted of ritual murder. Once again he was right—and once again he found that few offences are more dire than to be in the right when the great majority are in the wrong.

Notwithstanding or because of his struggles Masaryk's influence as a moral philosopher spread throughout the Slav world. Students from all the Slav regions of Austria-Hungary came to sit at his feet; and in 1909 a leading Austrian-German writer, Hermann Bahr, who had been studying the Southern Slav unitary movement and the reconciliation between the Serbs and the Croats of Austria-Hungary, wrote:—

It is remarkable that, when one enquires into this reconciliation and looks for the intermediaries who brought it about, one comes across, almost invariably, a pupil of Masaryk. It is nearly always somebody who, as a young man, once went to Prague, sat in his class-room and, awakened by him,

returned home to proclaim the gospel of concord. Masaryk's pupils have united the Serbs and Croats of Dalmatia and are now bringing that distracted province to have faith in the future—so strong is the influence of the lonely Slovak in Prague who seems to some a mixture of Tolstoy and Walt Whitman, to others a heretic, to others again an ascetic, and to all an enthusiast.

“The lonely Slovak in Prague” was a fair description of Masaryk, even as late as the spring of 1909. Independence of judgment, strength of character, and moral uprightness may gain for a man wide influence and deep respect without bringing him many friends. In Bohemian politics he and a handful of followers had founded a “Realist” party; and, as leader of this party—which, if I remember rightly, consisted of three members—he was re-elected by universal suffrage to the Austrian Parliament in 1907. There he challenged single-handed the whole system of semi-official fraud and forgery against the Southern Slavs that was laid bare in the Agram High Treason trial and the Friedjung trial of 1909; and, a year later, he convicted the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office of complicity in the system.

From that moment he felt that the Hapsburg Monarchy was doomed, that it must perish of its own inner untruth. Still, hoping against hope, he strove to withhold it from its fatal path, to induce it to solve the Southern Slav problem in its own favour, and to make of the Hapsburg dominions a home, not a prison, for the peoples that dwelt in them. He failed. Then, soon after the outbreak of the war in 1914, he went alone into exile, resolved never to return unless he could bring with him liberty and independence for the Czechoslovak nation.

His vision was equal to his courage. Among the leading figures in the Great War, none stands so high as he, either in unfaltering strength of purpose or as a creative statesman, for none entered the war with so keen a sense of its meaning as Masaryk. None saw so clearly as he, from the very beginning, what its outcome must be if Europe, and all that Europe stood for in the world, were to survive. Where is there a parallel to this Prague professor who went open-eyed into exile, counting, as with a practical reality, upon the spirit of Hus, raising the Hussite standard in the Hall of the Reformation at Geneva on July 6, 1915—the fourth centenary of the day when the Czech martyr

perished at the stake—as a deliberate declaration of war upon the whole spirit of the Hapsburg Counter-Reformation which had passed sentence of death upon the Czech people in 1620? Who gambled, or seemed to gamble, on so nice a balance of distant possibilities; and who, like him, saw his well-founded dreams come true in the collapse of the Hapsburg Monarchy, and was able to return home, after four years of work and wandering in Europe, Asia, and America, as the President of a free and united Czechoslovak Republic, to address himself to the mighty task of establishing the new State on sure foundations and to teach, day in day out, the lesson that democratic freedom can only be upheld by individual uprightness, hard work, and discharge of duty?

It is no disparagement to the personality or achievements of Adolf Hitler to suggest that he has still a long way to go before his record can bear comparison with that of the philosopher-statesman in the Castle of Prague. Nor can the worth and soundness of Hitlerite spell-binding be better appraised than by applying to it the standards which Masaryk set up for the Czechoslovak State. What those standards are Masaryk himself has defined in

his great work, *The World Revolution*, of which he allowed me to prepare, some years ago, an English version called *The Making of a State*. From this version, not from any fanciful or personal presentation of his ideas, I shall draw the substance of what I now have to say upon "Masaryk and the State Liberal."

* * *

Characteristically Masaryk begins his exposition by criticising the errors of Germany in the Great War, and by placing his finger upon the weak spots in German philosophy. The theory—which afterwards formed the groundwork of Hitlerite agitation—that Germany was "stabbed in the back" by insidious foes in her own household who thus robbed her of the victory due to her invincible arms, Masaryk declares to be untenable. It is not true, he insists, that the Allied victory was solely due to the demoralisation of the German army, to Socialist agitation, and to internal revolution. Yet even were this theory sound it would furnish new proof of the Germans' short-sightedness and ignorance of their own domestic conditions. And if the influence of the German Social Democrats, or Marxists, has to be taken into

account, the influence of Socialists and pacifists in Allied countries cannot be ignored. The truth is that war-weariness grew simultaneously in all belligerent countries; and grew for the same reasons.

But, Masaryk goes on, the defeat of Germany was not due to military deficiencies alone. As the German military authority, Clausewitz, rightly said, war is the pursuit of political ends by other means; and the whole German estimate of the situation in Central Europe and in the world, and even of the situation in Germany, was wrong. The pan-German scheme—the German army and its corps of officers were pan-German in tendency—was erudite, albeit of dubious quality. The Germans miscalculated the balance of forces, political, military, and economic; they over-estimated themselves and their allies, and underestimated their foes. At the outset they underestimated England and, until the last moment, they disbelieved in the military mobilisation of America. By experiments they proved to their own satisfaction that the American armies could not cross the Atlantic; and they exaggerated the power of submarines of which, in any case, they had too few. The way they deceived themselves about Austria is almost incompre-

hensible. Even in a military sense, absolutist monarchism was defeated by democracy.

What, then, was the meaning of the World War, of so immense a mass phenomenon in the history of Europe and of mankind? The Marxist explanation—that the capitalist system inevitably produces war—is, Masaryk insists, inadequate. The materialist interpretation of history is scientifically unsound, and the economic doctrine of historic materialism is one-sided. Nor is it enough to explain the World War as an outcome of Nationalism. National antagonisms were certainly among its causes, but they were not its sole cause. All kinds of complicated factors entered into it—dynastic aims, the interests of governments, the influence of statesmen and politicians, of journalists, of parliaments, of parties, and of intellectual tendencies. The task of history—and of a philosophy of history sounder than pan-German and Nationalist philosophy—will be to establish how the World War arose.

Roughly, Masaryk looks upon it as a struggle between the ideas of the West, which were those of the immense majority of mankind, and the ideas of Germany, who was supported by a minority grouped round the Central Powers. The ideas of the West are legacies of Renais-

sance and Reformation, with their outcome in the English, American, and French Revolutions, the parents of democracy—democracy being an attempt to organise mankind intensively as distinguished from the Theocracy of the Holy Roman Empire which tried to organise European mankind extensively. Before the advent of Hitlerism, Masaryk defined the post-war period as a transition from a residue of theocracy to the development of democracy on a humanitarian basis. How he judges the Hitlerite attempt to set up a new theocracy, on the basis of the God-given superiority of the Nordic Aryan German race, may be guessed from his shrewd analysis of the development of German thought and culture.

* * *

In the Middle Ages, he writes, German thought and culture formed part of those of Europe; but in more modern times they were increasingly differentiated and isolated. The Prussian State, which the Reformation strengthened, was aggressive from the outset and dominated Germany. The "State-idea," sometimes called "Statism," prevailed also in Western Europe, though there the State gradually became an organ of Parliament and

of public opinion. In Germany, on the contrary, the monarchical State was literally deified, and its absolute power generally recognised. Prussia and Germany were really an organised Caesarism: and Frederick the Great, Bismarck, William I, and William II, were essentially Caesars. The Prussian officer, the soldier, became the German criterion for the organisation of society and, indeed, of the world. The soldier and war were regular institutions. Nor did the Reformation, classical Humanism, Science, Art, and Philosophy prevail over theocracy in Germany so thoroughly as they prevailed in the West; for the German people accepted the Reformation only in part, and the German Lutheran Reformation received and adapted itself to Roman Law, together with sundry principles of Catholicism. Thus there arose a sort of Caesaro-Papism, with a Monarch ruling by Divine Right over State and Church alike; and, in course of time, pan-German Imperialism took the place of the humanitarian ideals of Lessing, Herder, Goethe, Kant, and Schiller, which were derived from secular and Western evolution and from participation in it.

In doctrine and policy pan-Germanism declined to recognise the rights of peoples to independence. Germany was to be lord and

master over all. Philosophically, the Germans rejected the idea of natural rights and substituted for it that of historical rights. Though Kant was recognised as the leading philosopher, his inclination towards natural right was spurned as humanitarian, and Darwin's doctrine of the survival of the fittest was invoked in support of historical right and of the theory that the strongest must rule. Thus war and the waging of war came to be looked upon as divine ordinances. The claim that all right is born of might became a dogma—might, in its turn, being identified with violence. In the name of this doctrine the German people were declared to be the ruling race. Even since the war (President Masaryk was writing before Hitlerism had taken shape) the pan-German identification of right with might has been upheld, notably by Professor Schäfer in his *State and Society* published in 1922. Schäfer maintains that right is solely the expression of might, and treats might as equivalent to force. He says textually: "The thing cannot be otherwise; force and might can create right."

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Continuing his historical analysis of German thought, Masaryk draws a genealogical tree

to show how various currents converged in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries from Goethe, Kant, and Frederick the Great to Hegel, who served as a philosophical junction for them and from whom they branched out again towards Bismarck, the pan-German Lagarde (a Prussian whose real name was von Bötticher), Marx, Nietzsche, and William II. He looks upon Hegel as a synthesis of Goethe and Kant, and an anticipation of Bismarck, for Hegel accepted the Prussian idea of the State as the highest expression of nationality, and, by his pantheism and fantastic philosophy, prepared the transition from the idea of the Universe held by Goethe and Kant to the mechanical materialism and violence of Prussianism. By his doctrine of "absolute idealism" Hegel supported the claim of the Prussian State to absolute authority, forsook the universal outlook and humaneness of Goethe and Kant, and laid the foundations for a policy of force in theory and in practice.

It was not for nothing, Masaryk adds, that Hegel was originally a theologian; and even in theology he propounded the principles of the Prussian theocracy. Bismarck and the Emperor William were always calling upon God—William II once referred to "my old ally,

God"—that is to say, the Prussian God, and Bismarck and Bismarckianism swallowed up Goethe. Yet the real antithesis in German thought is not between Goethe and Bismarck, Kant and Krupp. It lies between Beethoven and Bismarck, for Beethoven was a German genius unspoiled by Prussia. His Ninth Symphony is a hymn of humanity and democracy; and Beethoven, the man, upbraided Goethe, the Olympian of Weimar, for bowing low before the seats of the mighty. And Masaryk concludes his analysis by saying that while German thought, from Kant onwards, is one-sided, it is by no means feeble, superficial, or uninteresting. On the contrary, it is interesting and deep, though deep because it was not and could not be free. It is a Scholasticism like that of the Middle Ages, conditioned and limited by a ready-made creed laid down in advance. Just as the Prussian State and Prussianism are absolute, so German philosophy and German idealism are absolute, violent, and untrue. "They mistake the hugeness of a colossal Tower of Babel for the grandeur of a humanity united in freedom"; and their belief in their own titanic superiority, their doctrine of the German super-man is, in the last resort, belief in an irritable nervous creature who seeks, in

death or war, relief from chronic excitement, that is to say, relief in an excitement still more acute.

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The shrewdness and penetration of this criticism of German thought and practice are undeniable. Though it was written before the phenomenon of Hitlerism arose, it goes to the root of Hitlerism itself. The whole system of Hitlerite propaganda consists in the fostering of a chronic excitement from which relief is sought in preparation for war as the means of gaining "liberation" and world-mastery. Against this system Masaryk's own thought and practice are a standing, and a positive, protest. Negative protest is easy; positive protest, by deed no less than by word, is harder. And it is precisely in the vigour of its practical affirmations that the virtue of Masaryk's protest mainly lies.

Masaryk is no foe of sane nationalism, and he believes in the worth of tradition. He would have his own people return to the humane traditions of their pre-Austrian past and to the principles of their greatest teachers, notably Comenius and Chelčický:—

"We shall solve our own problem aright," he tells his fellow-countrymen, "if we comprehend that the more humane we are the more national we shall be. The relationship between the nation and mankind, between nationality and internationality, between nationalism and humaneness of feeling, is not that mankind as a whole and internationalism and humaneness are something apart from, against or above the nation and nationality, but that nations are the natural organs of mankind. . . . To a positive nationalism, one that seeks to raise a nation by intensive work, none can demur. Chauvinism, racial or national intolerance, not love of one's own people, is the foe of nations and of humanity. Love of one's own nation does not entail non-love of other nations.

"We restored our State in the name of democratic freedom," Masaryk continues, "and we shall only be able to preserve it through freedom increasingly perfected. . . . In the past (under Austria) our democratic aims were negative, a negation of Austrian absolutism. Now they must be positive. What we took as our ideal must become reality—and it will not be easy."

Easy it has certainly not been; but, thanks to President Masaryk's persistent influence and fidelity to his ideals, it has been done. Unprejudiced travellers, who returned recently to London from a visit to the principal countries of Central Europe agree in declaring that in Czechoslovakia alone does one breathe the

air of freedom and find that, even in the present difficult circumstances, all questions—social and national no less than international—are dealt with in a spirit of tolerant goodwill under representative leadership and firmness of administration.

Though, as Masaryk points out, pure democracy would be direct government by the people, the dimensions of nations and States make it impossible for democracy to be other than indirect, exercising its functions through parliament by means of elected representatives. But Parliament, he insists, and the governments responsible to it, must not seek to rule after the old fashion. They must ever bear in mind that their authority is derived by delegation from the people. They must protect individual right and freedom, for freedom is the aim and essence of democracy, which was begotten of modern individualism. Organising ability and administrative knowledge are needed in the conduct of a democratic State, and with them must go political sense, that is to say, comprehension of the goal towards which a nation and a State are tending. Statesmen, not merely politicians, are indispensable. Institutions by themselves are not enough. Democracy needs personalities, individuals who are capable

of creative political work. To-day there is talk of a crisis in parliamentarism. In most countries representative democracy is decried, and in varying degrees people are discontented with it. The true reform of Parliament can only come by reforming the electors, by their own political education and higher morality. Whatever the form of a parliament may be, education and morality among its members are essential postulates.

The same is true of the Civil Service. In absolutist States officialdom was a means of ruling; and in the Austrian Empire the lowest of the State railway officials lorded it over the people, as though to serve them were an act of grace. A democratic civil service exists to serve the people, and it must be upright and clean-handed. Democracy is more than a negation of absolutism; it is a higher, more positive stage of political development, and it must be economic and social as well as political. To proclaim and to practise the equality of citizens, to recognise that all are free, to uphold inwardly and outwardly the humane principle of brotherhood is as much a moral as a political innovation.

In all democratic countries, and not least in the republics that have succeeded to monarchical or aristocratic systems, leading positions have been taken in politics and in the public services by men devoid of higher education. How to preserve the special knowledge that is required in any administration, and any parliament, is a problem that arises in every democracy as soon as the centre of parliamentary gravity shifts towards the great popular parties. Practically, the question is one of retaining, under a parliamentary system, the necessary number of educated specialists for the work of government and administration. Yet it is true that the academically educated and capable official is often inferior to the experienced organiser and party leader in knowledge of men and in practical capacity for dealing with parties, parliaments and governments; for political sense and statecraft are not to be acquired solely by schooling or even by administrative experience. Moreover, the problem of the educated comprises that of the semi-educated; and semi-education, as a phase of the period of transition from theocracy to democracy, is the peculiar curse of our society and of our era. Democracy has, therefore, to find means of turning semi-education into education.

Men are too apt to let words do duty for ideas and things. They love "good round words," which are by no means the same thing as the general ideas which accompany the development of thought. Such general ideas need to be expressed concretely, care being taken, on the one hand, to avoid mere catchwords and, on the other, to remember that in politics and practical life watchwords are indispensable. They are the more indispensable because publicity and criticism are essential to democratic freedom.

This is where democracy differs from aristocracy. This, too, is why public opinion has so great an importance in modern life. Freedom of opinion is a form of political freedom, and a condition of it. In practice, journalism and the daily press are institutions of parliamentary control over governments. The freedom of the press ensures the right to criticise public men and the whole apparatus of the State. Criticism is at once a postulate and a method of democratic policy, just as it is a postulate and method of science and the scientific spirit. The right to criticise is a right of political initiative; and in the possession of this right lies the great responsibility of the press. But, since politics and journalism are so intimately related, it is

necessary that the difference between them should be clearly understood. Newspapers are points of crystallisation for tendencies, groups, and parties, though newspapers have their own particular business interests, and the wish to increase the circulation of a party newspaper may easily lead to demagoguery and partisan misrepresentation. It is often a question how far the interests of a party or of a group coincide with the interest of the State and nation; and in the haste of working for the day, or even for the minute, the precision of journalistic judgment and of reporting is apt to suffer—a drawback that explains the general desire for the reform of journalism and for the education of journalists.

For these abuses or defects there is but one remedy—truth and truthfulness, coupled with freedom to speak and write the truth. Democracy, Masaryk insists once more, should mean moral renovation in politics, in education and throughout the whole range of public and private life. It does not and should not mean a belittling of the State's outward authority. He says:—

I do not belittle this authority, but I cannot deify it and its power. When I took upon myself the obligations of the Presidential office, well knowing

what my daily administrative tasks would be, it was clear to me that no State or policy can prosper unless the groundwork be moral. As St. Paul wrote at the beginning of the fourth chapter of the second Epistle to the Corinthians: "Therefore, seeing we have this Ministry, as we have received mercy, we faint not; but have renounced the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness nor handling the word of God deceitfully; but by manifestation of the truth commending ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God." This is the programme of democracy *sub specie aeternitatis*. The ethical basis of all politics is humanity, and humanity is an international programme. It is a new word for the old love of our fellow-men.

And, in direct opposition to Hegelian teaching, he declares it to be a false notion that political men need take no thought of ethical principles when the interest of the State is involved:—

No State, no society, can be managed without general recognition of the ethical bases of the State and of politics; and no State can long stand if it infringes the broad rules of human morality. The authority of the State and of its laws is derived from general recognition of ethical principles and from general agreement among citizens upon the main postulates of philosophy and life. Once again—Democracy is not alone a form of State and of administration. It is a philosophy of life and an

outlook upon the world. The Greeks and Romans declared justice to be the foundation of States; and justice is the arithmetic of love. The law, written and unwritten, enables the State gradually to extend the injunction of love to all the practical relations of social life and, in case of need, to enforce compliance with it. Hence the old dispute about the relative value of morality and law. Though an ethical minimum, the law, as the embodiment of public right, carries great weight by reason of its definiteness and practical adequacy. In practice, the State approaches the ethical maximum—the ideal—through the ethical minimum—the law—and human evolution brings the minimum ever nearer to the ideal.

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In conclusion Masaryk examines the question of democracy and dictatorship. Genuine democracy, he urges, demands of every citizen a living interest in public affairs and in the State, just as the Church demands living faith from believers. One of the evils of absolutism is that the State comes to be looked upon as the enemy of individual citizens, whereas in a true democracy each and all are the State. "State sense" implies renunciation of political indifference, and a positive interest in the way authority is exercised. If anybody wishes to call this authority by any other name than that of

"The State" he is welcome to do so, for it is the thing that matters, not the word. But it is certain that the State, even the democratic State, is no divine, omniscient, omnipotent institution such as Hegel conceived. It is human, sometimes very human, with all the weaknesses and imperfections of the men who organise and direct it. It is never so bad and unreasonable as the anarchists say, nor so good and lovely as its semi-official apologists pretend. Taking it all round it is not worse than any other work of man; and it is a necessity.

Nor are the imperfections of the State, or even of its laws, a warrant for the suppression of individual right by dictatorship. The German and pan-German doctrine that might creates right, in so far as might is identical with violence and does not represent the moral will of the community, must be rejected. Absolutism does not consist in the existence of a ruler, but in his assertion of infallibility. It crept into the conception of the State when, after emancipating itself from ecclesiastical guardianship, the State claimed something of the absolute authority which had been peculiar to the Pope as the head of the Roman Church. Resistance to absolutism, in the form of dictatorship or otherwise, has been characteristic of democratic

progress throughout the modern era; and it must still be resisted, whether the right to dictate be claimed by the proletariat, the State or the Church. The democratic contention is sound that as little as possible should be demanded of the State, for in reality this contention means that democracy requires of every citizen public spirit and a sense of the law. Democracy is based on individualism, that is to say, on the effort to strengthen individuality and the sense of individual responsibility. It means self-government, which means self-control, and self-government begins at home.

Only by virtue of individual self-control, coupled with a general living interest in the State and with a constant development of public spirit, is democracy possible, for democracy implies a natural right to take the initiative in every form of public life, no matter whether the right be formally expressed in law or not. In a free State this right exists *de facto*. Nor is it entirely true that the main object of political and State-creative activity is to organise. (The Germans, for instance, have over-organised themselves.) By force of habit any and every organisation tends to become mechanical. We need living organisations. How are we to get

them if we are not ourselves individually alive? Life is change, constant change, constant growth. An active people will make living organisations new and ever new in the State and in society.

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This, in short, is Masaryk's conception of the State liberal and of the conditions for its existence and growth. In Central Europe to-day the State he has created stands almost alone against the Hitlerite and Fascist conceptions. Ought we therefore to conclude that the State liberal is necessarily inferior to the State illiberal? I think not, if only for the reason that the State liberal has the power to engender and to keep alive the faith of free individuals in the postulates of freedom. Nothing in Masaryk's conception is more significant than his insistence upon liberty to think, to speak and to criticise as an essential attribute of democracy and of the democratic State; for it is noteworthy that the first care of all absolutist systems, ancient and modern, has been and is to suppress this right.

In a remarkable and entertaining autobiography, the *Happy Retrospect* of a great Austrian noble, Count Hans Wilczek, a terse

description is given of life in Vienna under the Metternichian system a century ago. It runs: "Politics were discussed only in academic circles. The police force was suspicious and touchy, and the censorship, which kept a watch both over the written and the spoken word, was very strict. Nevertheless, life under these conditions, and the enjoyment of peace, were for the Viennese preferable to the struggle for a disturbing freedom."

Here we have the thing in a nutshell—"a disturbing freedom," in contradistinction to tranquil enslavement. Herr Hitler and his fellows call this enslavement "like-mindedness." Signor Mussolini calls it "totalitarian." But Mr. Bernard Shaw puts the case for criticism, or freedom to express diversity of view, very ably in the preface to his play *On the Rocks*. He says:—

Put shortly and undramatically the case is that a civilisation cannot progress without criticism, and must therefore, to save itself from stagnation and putrefaction, declare impunity for criticism. This means impunity not only for propositions which, however novel, seem interesting, statesmanlike, and respectable, but for propositions that shock the uncritical as obscene, seditious, blasphemous, heretical, and revolutionary. That sound Catholic

institution, the Devil's Advocate, must be privileged as possibly the Herald of the World to Come. The difficulty is to distinguish between a critic and the criminal or lunatic, between liberty of precept and liberty of example. . . . Karl Marx writing the death-warrant of private property in the reading-room of the British Museum was sacred ; but if Karl Marx had sent the rent of his villa in Maitland Park to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and shot the landlord's agents when they came to distrain on his furniture or execute a writ of ejectment, he could hardly have escaped hanging by pleading his right to criticise. Not until the criticism changes the law can the magistrate allow the critic to give effect to it. We are so dangerously uneducated in citizenship that most of us assume we have an unlimited right to change our conduct the moment we have changed our minds.

• Lack of education in citizenship is the worst foe of freedom. It, in the last resort, explains the rise of Bolshevism, Fascism and Nazism alike. Masaryk stands for full education in citizenship and for faith in the virtue of individual freedom and individual responsibility. How such a faith compares with that which the prophets of German Nazism are assiduously instilling into the minds of their people the next chapter may show.

NAZISM AS A FAITH

CHAPTER III

NAZISM AS A FAITH

IN the foregoing chapter I described President Masaryk's reasoning as that of "a sane and responsible leader." The reasoning of the prophets of Nazism which has now to be considered may strike some readers as that of insane and irresponsible charlatans. Against this impression a word of caution may not be misplaced. If it be asked: "Why bother about the insane?" the answer is that, as long as maniacs are under restraint, and are properly looked after in a well-appointed asylum or elsewhere, their notions may be of little concern to the outside world; but that when the maniacs take charge of their asylum, suppress its guardians, prepare to break out, and to enforce their mania as a rule of life upon others, it is time to seek the method in their madness.

Symptoms of mania are apparent even in the writings of Herr Hitler himself. For instance, the passage from his chapter on "The State" which I have already quoted contains the statement: "A people's level of

culture is not the standard by which the goodness of a State can be measured. Comprehensible though it be that a highly civilised people should appear to be worthier than a negro tribe, the State-organism of such a people, viewed from the standpoint of the attainment of its end, may be worse than that of negroes"—the end to be attained being purity of race or blood, and the aim of the Hitlerite State being the purity of the "Aryan," Germanic and Nordic race and blood.

In judging this statement it is well to remember that there is no such thing as an Aryan race or Aryan blood, that there is no scientific correlation between mental and bodily characters and that, as Professor Gordon Childe, our foremost authority on Pre-History, frankly states, anyone who talks of "racial mentality" is a charlatan. He adds (in the archaeological review *Antiquity*): "Until the workings of heredity in men have been far more exhaustively and dispassionately studied, and the idea of race re-established on a truly scientific basis, it is surely rash to give statutory sanction to nostrums based on false analogies between men and poultry. . . . It should be easy to dispel the popular confusion between race and culture or race and language—a

confusion involved, for instance, in the phrase 'Aryan race' and in legislation using that expression." Professor Childe is alluding, of course, to the "Aryan Paragraph" which has been introduced into Hitlerite legislation, and is being applied against "non-Aryan" Germans not only in regard to the present and future but retrospectively to their ancestors as far back as the middle of the eighteenth century.

* * *

Fanatical belief in the "Aryan" myth is the first symptom of Nazi mania; and, as becomes a myth, its precise meaning is by no means clear. It seems to be adaptable to circumstances. Neither Gobineau nor Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the chief creators of this myth, would have thought of classifying the "Yellow races" as "Aryan." Gobineau, for his part, put them lower than the White race (of which he thought the Aryans were the progenitors), and declared the yellow men to be superior only to the Melanesian race which he classified as the lowest in the human scale. But now, it seems, the German Nazi authorities are prepared to recognise the Japanese as worthy of "Aryan" rank and dignity. In *The Times* of May 11, 1934, Princess

Elizabeth Bibesco, daughter of the late Lord Oxford and Asquith, stated that a German professor of ethnography (whose name she communicated to the Editor of *The Times*) belonging to one of the most distinguished German universities, had received instructions to teach his students that the Japanese are Aryans. Those instructions he ignored, not once but thrice. After his third refusal to comply with them, friends warned him that he was about to be imprisoned. The learned professor then left Germany and betook himself to Switzerland.

With a transparent allusion to the naval strength of Japan—and to the many signs of political intimacy between that country and Germany—Princess Bibesco propounded a riddle which, she thinks, only Dr. Goebbels, the Hitlerite Minister of Propaganda, can answer. It is: "How many cruisers does it take to make an Aryan?" The beginnings of an answer were to be found in the reports from Berlin upon the "unusually cordial" reception given there, on May 9th, to Vice-Admiral Matsushita, Commander of the Japanese Training Ship Squadron, and his officers during their visit to the German capital; and inspired German commentators on their visit

remarked that, in spite of distance and differences, "there is between Japan and Germany an undeniable relationship of thought and feeling which finds particular expression in the exalted view of the mission of the State."

Here we are brought back, somewhat unexpectedly, to the principle that similarity of view upon "the mission of the State" may have important practical consequences. In Japan, as in Hitlerite Germany and Fascist Italy, the State is deified. In Japan, the sacred person of the Emperor, who is held to be of divine origin, overshadows and embodies the State. In Italy the philosophers of Fascism claim that the State possesses, in the temporal sphere, the same divine authority as the Church in the spiritual sphere; and, if Signor Mussolini's own organ, the *Popolo d'Italia*, is to be believed, Mussolini himself is godlike. It wrote not long ago:—

With him and thanks to him, no question arises in our minds. We know that he guides us, we know that nothing is too difficult nor too dangerous with him and for him.

His intuition is exact, his will divine, his understanding of human strength and weakness infinite.

His daily miracle is to implant in all near him, in all who obey him, a fraction of his supernatural gifts.

No German journal has, as far as I am aware, yet ascribed divine attributes to Herr Hitler—even if, in German schools, he is constantly compared to Christ—but Herr Georg Schott in *Das Volksbuch vom Hitler* writes that “in this man’s mortal frame the Original Germanic Nature is incarnate.” At all events the prophets of Nazism argue, with Hitler, that the State which he personifies is the instrument by which alone purity of blood can be secured in the “Aryan” Nordic race whose God-given superiority entitles it to the overlordship of the world.

* * *

In accordance with these premises it is natural and consistent that the behaviour of Japan, Germany, and, at some moments, of Fascist Italy towards the League of Nations and the acceptance of international restrictions upon the freedom of States to make war in pursuance of their national policies, should be substantially the same. Indeed, the question arises whether those nations which believe or have believed that war is an abomination, and that peace could and ought to be organised in a warless world, are not suffering from some form of collective hallucination. If they are

sane, must not other nations, whose dictators believe and act otherwise, be looked upon as victims of pernicious illusions.

Militant manias, especially when religious or quasi-religious expression has been given to them, have more than once affected the course of human history. The ideas of the Christian crusaders may now be thought fantastic, and the dream of wresting the Holy Sepulchre from the Moslem infidel an insufficient justification for the great Crusades which enlisted the support of Christendom. But the force of those ideas and the influence of that dream upon medieval history cannot be denied. Again, Western peoples may not think the Gospel of Mahomet a creed to which they can give unreserved adherence. Yet that creed carried the sword of Islam into many lands, and is to-day the living faith of hundreds of millions. The Nazi creed is sometimes called "the New Islam"; and one writer, at least, who has studied its effects declares that, before Hitlerism can be checked, it may shatter half the world. Therein, he adds, lies the acute significance of the whole problem.

Herr Hitler is by no means alone in teaching the Nazi faith to the youth of Germany.

Among its apostles none, not even Herr Hitler himself, is better accredited as its exponent than Herr Alfred Rosenberg who was originally one of Hitler's mentors. Him Hitler appointed, on February 1, 1934, to be Educational Dictator of Germany. On that day Herr Rosenberg was entrusted with "the entire spiritual and philosophic instruction and education of the (Nazi) party and of its co-ordinated associations, including the schooling of workmen after their day's labour." This means that Herr Rosenberg was made responsible for moulding the minds of three million Nazi Storm Troopers, the millions of workers organised in the "Labour front," and, above all, the millions of youths now incorporated and disciplined in the "Hitler Youth." With this "Hitler Youth" the Protestant Evangelical Youth, numbering seven hundred thousand members, has been merged at the behest of Hitler's Protestant Primate, Bishop Müller. This has been done in fulfilment of the cardinal tenet of Nazi—and, for that matter, of Italian Fascist and Russian Bolshevik—doctrine that the mind of youth must be captured and trained so that the faith may be handed down from one generation to another.

Herr Rosenberg's principal work is called *The Mythos of the Twentieth Century*. With a kindred work by Professor Ernst Bergmann, of Leipzig University, it has been placed by the Pope upon the Index of forbidden books. But this hardly detracts from their significance as expressions of Nazi thought. If the Holy See has been moved to take action against Hitler's educational dictator, it may be the more necessary to look into his doctrines with some care. From their quality and his antecedents an inkling of the true Nazi faith may perhaps be gleaned, and the paths descried along which it is likely to impel German youth.

Herr Alfred Rosenberg is a native of the former Baltic provinces of Russia. Despite his Jewish-sounding name he is, apparently, a pure Germanic "Aryan" by blood and race. He is said to have been a soldier in the Russian army during the war and, after the war, to have fled to Munich, where he made the acquaintance of Hitler. The circumstance that Herr Rosenberg had been trained as an architect, and that Hitler's artistic ambitions long ran in the direction of architecture, may first have brought the two men together. In any event, the violence of Herr Rosenberg's anti-Jewish opinions will have commended

him to Hitler. These opinions, and other ingredients of the Nazi faith, Herr Rosenberg was enabled to hammer into the heads of the Hitler Storm Troopers through the columns of the chief Hitlerite organ, the *Voelkischer Beobachter*, of which he was made editor. Presently he was also chosen to be chief of the Nazi Party Foreign Political Department which, since the advent of Hitlerism, occupies a suite of offices in the Wilhelmstrasse, only a few yards away from the official German Foreign Office in that famous street.

In London we have mixed memories of Herr Alfred Rosenberg. He honoured us with a visit in the summer of 1933 as the first official Nazi emissary, and distinguished himself by placing a wreath, adorned with the Nazi anti-Semitic and "Aryan" emblem, the Swastika, or Hooked Cross, upon the Cenotaph in Whitehall. A British officer promptly threw the wreath into the Thames. It was fished out by the police, and the offending officer was admonished and fined by a London magistrate. Which was as it should be—though not a few of the officer's fellow-countrymen would gladly have received the admonition and paid the fine had they been able similarly to express their feelings.

The main thesis of Herr Rosenberg's *Mythos of the Twentieth Century* is that the Great War was the gigantic eclipse of an epoch outworn and worthless, and that it is the task of the twentieth century to create a new type of man from a new German mythology. This new mythology awoke in the midst of battle, and the German dead were the martyrs of a new faith whose battle-cry is: "With Sword and Plough for Honour and Freedom." German National Socialism must show that it can bestow on the German nation not only a political aim, but also an ideal of beautiful masculine strength and will-power. These new German men must be like unto gods, the might of whose souls must overcome the noxious influence with which, through Christianity, Rome and Jerusalem, have poisoned the races of Europe. In the new German State the Church must be purged of all traces of Jewish doctrine and of pacifism and humility. The Old Testament must be abolished once and for all. Its place will be taken by Nordic sagas and legends, and by the dream of honour and freedom which Nordic sagas have inspired from Odin onwards. Instead of the crucified Deity, the Germanic Churches will show Christ as the

fearless, spirited teacher, the hero in the highest sense of the word. Jehovah must be expunged from the hymn books, and the notion of neighbourly or brotherly love must be subordinated to that of national honour.

According to Rosenberg, the so-called Christian virtues—meekness, humility, charity, pacifism, racial equality—are essentially inferior to the German virtues of strength, courage, manliness, militarism, physical beauty, patriotism, honour, and belief in racial purity. Rosenberg's creed runs:—

The God whom we revere would not exist if our soul and our blood did not exist. Therefore everything which protects, purifies and strengthens the honour and the freedom of this soul and this blood is the concern of our religion, our rights and our State. Our Holy Places are those where German heroes died, where monuments and memorials remind us of them. Our Holy Days are those on which they fought most passionately. And the Holy Hour of the German will come when the symbol of awakening, the banner with the sign of rising life (the Hooked Cross) has become the one dominating faith of the German Reich.

An essential condition of education, Herr Rosenberg believes, is to recognise that Chris-

tianity did not bring civilisation, but that Christianity owes its enduring values to the Germanic character. A little volume of carols, entitled *Christmas in The Third Reich*, which was issued in 1933, shows how this recognition is likely to proceed. It contains Hitlerite versions of Christian hymns, and celebrates Hitler as the Leader whom Christ has sent to redeem the German land in an ever-shining dawn of hope and joy. Not less significant is a new version of the Psalms, published in Germany on the morrow of Herr Rosenberg's appointment as National Educator, by Herr Wilhelm Teudt. The book is called *God-Songs for German People*. Herr Teudt has pruned, compressed and in some cases re-written the original Psalms, with the result that seventy-five German "God-songs" replace one hundred and fifty Jewish Psalms. For instance, the second verse of the 87th Psalm: "The Lord loveth the gates of Zion more than all the dwellings of Jacob," runs in Herr Teudt's version: "The Lord loveth the heights of Germania more than foreign places." Jewish names, he says, "lend an unnatural flavour to our intercourse with God," and he replaces the fourth verse of the 87th Psalm by the lines: "I will make mention of the Odenwald

and the oak of the Baltic, of the Volga, Euphrates and Ganges.”

* * *

Readers of Herr Rosenberg's *Mythos of the Twentieth Century* will feel no surprise at these efforts to rid German Christianity of the Jewish taint. Starting from the premises that all the systems of State which existed before 1914 have collapsed, even if they still exist formally or in part, and that all social, ecclesiastical and philosophical conceptions and “values” have likewise broken down, so that no supreme principle now holds unchallenged sway over the life of peoples, he alleges that the blood of Germans, shed in the war, is returning to life. In the soul of the German folk new cells are being built up. Present and future appear in a new light; and, for the future, a new German mission reveals itself. No longer is it a fight between class and class or dogma and dogma, but a settlement between blood and blood, race and race, folk and folk—a struggle of soul values against soul values. “Soul” means “race” looked at from within, and race is soul seen from without. The task of our century is to awaken the race-soul and to bring the State, art and religion into its

service. In other words, it is to create a new human type out of a new Mythos of life. For this, courage is needed. Whoever wishes to go forward must burn his boats behind him. The answer which the new man in the coming German Reich will give to all doubts and questionings is: "Alone, I will."

Against the evangelical theologians who have charged him with having deified the German folk in unchristian fashion, Herr Rosenberg puts forward the counter-charge that these same theologians have done little but deify the eternal enemy, the parasitic Hebrew folk. The greatest deed of Martin Luther was to smother the ideas of an exotic priesthood and then to Germanise Christianity; and the greatest deed of the twentieth century must be to restore the freedom of healthy German blood so that it may flow in a mighty stream towards a German Nordic rebirth.

In the course of a long disquisition upon the influences of ancient civilisations—those of India, Persia, Egypt and Greece in particular—Rosenberg manages to put together an astonishing jumble of pseudo-erudite conclusions, some of which would have filled Gobineau and Houston Stewart Chamberlain with jealous envy. He carries Chamberlain's

tentative suggestions to the point of declaring that there is "not the slightest convincing reason to suppose that Jesus was of Jewish origin, even if he grew up in the atmosphere of Jewish thought." He quotes sundry scribes, German and other, as proof that the mother of Christ came from the country of Dan, and that his father was a Roman. "Jesus," says one of these scribes, "was thus descended from two of the greatest and most celebrated races, on his mother's side from the Syrians and on his father's side from the Romans." Carrying this doctrine a step farther, and treating Syrians and Romans as "Germanic," teachers of religion in German elementary schools now instruct their pupils that "Judas the Jew betrayed Jesus the German to the Jews."

Having redeemed the Founder of Christianity from the ignominy of being the offspring of Jews, Herr Rosenberg claims that to-day, two thousand years after the entry of the Germans into history, every instance of creative power, culture and spirit of enterprise is seen to be attributable to men of Northern blood. He follows Chamberlain in arguing that the downfall of "Germanic" France was due to the persecution and exile of the Huguenots, the loss of whose blood changed the character of the

French nation. Therefore the history of France, taken as that of the realm of the Franks, is to-day at an end. "No matter whether Clerical lust of power, or free-thinking stupidity, prevails in their land, the French will lack any creative impulse. As a result of racial misbreeding, France will be inspired by instinctive racial fear, which is never absent from mongrels, however victorious they may outwardly seem to be. Hence also the trembling fright of the French in the presence of Germany, whom only the efforts of the entire globe could overthrow. And Germany has good reason to study the life-line of the neighbouring French people so as to rouse every inner German impulse of defence against a like fate."

For similar reasons, Rosenberg goes on, the Czechoslovaks are no better than the French. Though John Hus cut adrift from the universalism of the Roman Church, as Lutheran Germany and Huguenot France presently did, Hus acted under Anglo-Saxon (and therefore Germanic) influence, represented by John Wyclif. But during the Hussite wars, after the martyrdom of Hus, the Czechs followed the leadership of men of an Eastern, semi-Asiatic type, and were dominated by the Alpine and Dinaric elements among them, elements in

which uncultured wildness was linked with frightful superstition. (He forgets to say that the Hussites conquered Germany as far as the mouth of the Elbe.) Then, in the Hapsburg-Jesuit Counter-Reformation, these lower elements prevailed until the Czechs lost all creative power, and became well-nigh worthless. "To promise 'freedom' to Czechs, Poles and Levantines," Rosenberg declares, "would be to-day to foster a chaos of races. Freedom means loyalty to one's own kind, for only the (Germanic) kind can guarantee the highest possible development. And loyalty to type demands protection for the type." The race-type, which is the supreme "value" in the life of a race, of a folk, is not to be found in a logically-developing philosophy, but in the affirmation of a mystical synthesis, an activity of soul that, in the last resort, stands far above rational criticism and is not so much a matter of knowledge as a creed, a racial creed, a faith in values expressed in character. Thanks to this creed, the reason and the will can be brought into harmony with the flowing stream of the Germanic soul and race.

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In a long and particularly muddled chapter Rosenberg contrasts the Germanic idea of honour with the degenerate Christian idea of love, and what he looks upon as the Jewish idea of humaneness. The Germanic cult of Wotan, or Odin, he thinks far worthier, for the Northern gods were beings of light, whose brows were crowned with a luminous aura. Their weapon was the spear and they bore the Hooked Cross, or Swastika, as the symbol and the sign of fruitful life. Long before 3000 B.C. the successive waves of Northern peoples brought this symbol to Greece, to Rome, to Troy, and to India, until the Cross to which Jesus was nailed, the Roman gallows, was set up as a counter-symbol. The Christian virtues of love, humility, renunciation, obedience stood over against the Germanic virtues of honour, dignity, self-assertion, and pride. The Christian cult of compassion, which takes another form in the Freemasonic notion of humaneness, is equally hostile to true German virtue; and in Jesuitism the Roman-Christian system, with its demand for corpse-like obedience, became an open challenge to Western Germanic spiritual life. The idea of honour was trodden under foot. Knightly qualities were despised. Presently, however,

the Germanic conception of honour found a refuge among German traders in the Hanseatic League, an organisation of great moral power to which seventy-five city-States belonged. But Freemasonry, with its so-called tolerant and humane principles, which conceded to Jew and Turk the same status as to Christians, set itself against this Hanseatic centre of German strength. Thanks to such "humane-ness," niggers and Jews could marry into the Northern race.

The living idea of honour was incorporated in the Northern Vikings, in the Germanic knights, in Prussian officers, in the Hanseatic Baltic States, in German soldiers and in German peasants. An even finer embodiment of it was to be found in the German mystics to whom honour and freedom were the inner fortress of the soul, a fortress from which true will and true reason could sally forth into the world. The glad evangel of the German mystics was throttled by the Roman Church before it could bear full fruit; but greatness of soul is wider than the heavens; for, if the soul is to know God, it must know Him beyond space and time. This was the doctrine of Meister Eckehart, the aristocrat of German mystics, who held the noble soul to be the

highest value in itself. This idea consigns love, meekness, compassion to a much lower level of virtue. "A hand of genius," Rosenberg writes, "will be needed to pick the jewels of the German spirit out of the silt of the ages and organically to connect and to arrange them. To-day it is clearer than ever how fleeting and time-bound are the Roman and Jewish conceptions. The true heart-beat of our (German) legends, those of Eckehart and Luther, rises towards us. . . . To shape the yearning of the Northern race-soul into a German Church under the sign of a folk-mythos is one of the greatest tasks of our century. Just as the Roman mythos of the Pope as the Vicar of God embraced and bound together the most varied peoples and the most dispersive tendencies, so the mythos of blood—once it has been grasped—will act like a magnet upon all personalities and religious communities, despite their differences, and give them a clear, architectonic habitation related to one centre, and therefore life-creating in the people as a whole. How this is to be done in detail, the coming life will determine."

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Turning from religion to architecture and art, Rosenberg passes in review the various European styles of building, and goes on to deal with painting, music, literature and the drama as a prelude to the assertion that "What is essential in all Western art has been revealed in Richard Wagner—that the Northern soul is not contemplative, that it does not lose itself in individual psychology, but experiences cosmic laws and gives them spiritual and architectonic shape." The time will come, he says, when the peoples of the earth will revere their great dreamers as their greatest doers. Then the world will be saved from degeneration—a degeneration revealed in the collapsing world of the nineteenth century by the movement for the emancipation of women.

Woman, Rosenberg admits, has her part to play in the world, but not in the State. The attempt to "emancipate" women, by bringing them into political and public life, and the liberal doctrines of freedom, unrestricted freedom of movement, free trade, parliamentarism, human equality and the equality of the sexes, are so many sins against the laws of nature. The German doctrine demands, on the contrary, authority, restriction, discipline, pro-

tection of racial character, and recognition of the eternal polarity, the positive and negative natures of the two sexes. The most sacred and the grandest task of women is to preserve the purity of the race; and the first demand of women, in a generation that wishes to save the basis of all culture and civilisation, is that woman should be emancipated from the emancipation of women.

Summing up his various affirmations, Herr Rosenberg declares that the idea of honour, national honour, is the beginning and end of thought and action. It tolerates no other injunction, neither Christian love nor Freemasonic humaneness nor Roman philosophy. Bismarck, the creator of the German Empire; Moltke, the creator of the German General Staff; and the Prussian officer, are exemplifications of this truth. Only the raceless can demand anarchical freedom, for true freedom is possible solely within the pure race-type. With this true freedom the idea of honour is inseparably bound up. Therefore the battle-cry of the new type must be, "With Sword and Plough for Honour and Freedom."

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This, necessarily inadequate, summary of a

book of seven hundred closely printed pages gives but a faint idea of the masses of rhetorical verbiage from which I have extracted it. If it shows clear signs of mania, and militant mania to boot, it ought not, therefore, to be rejected as of no account. A leader of one of the chief religious societies of Protestant Germany, the Evangelical League, has declared ruefully that Herr Rosenberg's *Mythos of the Twentieth Century* is being "devoured" by German students, who look upon its author as the founder of a new religion, a religion of blood, with Germany, not Palestine, as the Holy Land. Alongside of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, Herr Rosenberg's evangel forms, indeed, the substratum of Nazism as a faith, a faith at once mystical and political, and foreshadowing political action in a spirit of religious fanaticism.

Rosenberg defines his political ideal as a "Nordic Europe with a German Central Europe; with Germany, a racial and national State, as the Central Power of the Continent and its bulwark against the south and south-east; with the Scandinavian States and Finland as a second unit, a bulwark against the north-east; and with Great Britain as a bulwark of the west, and of the seas wherever such a bulwark may be necessary in the

interest of the Northern man." The so-called "Spirit of the West," Rosenberg declares, is in reality nothing more than a mixture of modern French with Jewish democratic ideas, as expressed in the parliamentary system. One ought not to speak abstractly of "the West" but rather of a Franco-Jewish system of thought, for history proves that the political evolution of England has followed quite other lines than those of France, and everybody who knows anything of English history is aware that, despite her so-called representative system, England has been governed for centuries in thoroughly aristocratic fashion. And France who, even after the war, occupied the Rhineland, the cradle of European civilisation, with coloured troops, and whose military spokesmen declared in Parliament that she disposes not of two armies, a white and a black, but of a single army, is to-day hardly to be looked upon as a European State, for she has taken the lead in the besmirching of Europe by the blacks, just as she began one hundred and forty years ago to emancipate the Jews. Thus France is no longer European, but is rather, under Jewish guidance, "a projection of Africa into Europe."

It is not surprising that the Pope should

have put this work of the Educational Dictator of Germany on the Index of Forbidden Books, together with the kindred work of Professor Ernst Bergmann, of Leipzig University. Both books are manifestly incompatible with the Roman Catholic faith. Of the two, that of Professor Bergmann may be the more fantastic yet not for that reason the less significant. One of the difficulties in dealing with it is to find an adequate English rendering of its title, *Deutschland, das Bildungsland der neuen Menschheit*, which is taken from Fichte, though Fichte might turn in his grave if he knew how Professor Bergmann expounds it.

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Bergmann's book is published under the sign of the *Nordic Flower of God*, and bears as a sub-title *A National Socialist Philosophy of Culture*. The Introduction to it is called "The German Idealism of 'Bildung'"—whatever "Bildung" may be; for, like so many other German terms, the word is ambiguous. It may mean "education," but it may also mean "formation" or "fashioning." Professor Bergmann uses it to suggest that Germany is the land in which a new mankind is to be formed, developed, trained and religiously inspired to

worship Nordic men as incarnations of the Nordic God.

The first section of the book deals with "Die Aufartung der Nation," that is to say, the restoration of the German people to purity of race-type. In this process "Bildung" plays a principal part. Professor Bergmann explains that "Bildung" is neither spoon-fed knowledge nor the over-organisation of educational institutions but something more "Promethean"—the art of forming men. Those "formed" in the new German land will not be pundits or even men of many-sided knowledge, students or intellectuals. "They will be those in whom the whole man is formed, transformed, formed through and through, formed upwards—whereto character of the heart and the development of personality belong—the mere formation or training of the intellect acquiring high significance solely within the framework of the total formation of the human being." With human beings, thus formed, all differences of class and social standing vanish. "Cleanliness of thought and feeling, righteousness of will and deed, diligence, doggedness, power of decision, courage and faithfulness, spirit of sacrifice and readiness to help, patriotism and piety—whoever possesses these virtues at

the end of his school days, or apprenticeship, alongside of his professional training or craftsmanship, and has withal 'an ever gladsome heart,' a healthy heredity, knowledge of the sacredness and sublimeness of earthly life and, maybe, also of the greatness of the tasks of the German people in the history of mankind—he is a well-formed or educated German."

How many Germans to-day, asks Professor Bergmann, have a right to repeat Fichte's words and to call Germany the land wherein the new mankind is to be shaped. For Fichte the Germans were the salt of the earth, the teachers of the peoples, the bearers and the instruments of the moral elevation of man. He saw in them the initiates and the enthusiasts of the divine world-plan, the people by whom the divine in the world reveals itself. He thought that if the Germans should succeed, by a clear and thoughtful art of self-ennoblement, in reaching a higher moral plane, their claim to educate humanity could not be gainsaid. Fichte's teaching of a German faith was therefore deeply religious; and Professor Bergmann dreams of a German race of men like gods who shall fulfil the dream of making the eternal and the divine in the world to blossom as a flower.

NAZISM AS A FAITH

Even those Germans who betrayed their land in the revolution of November 1918 stood, in Professor Bergmann's eyes, high above the Jacobins of the French Revolution who beheaded their King. Not a hair of the head of any one of the many German kings was touched; and there is no example in history of a revolution so purely organising and non-violent as the Nazi revolution of 1933. To attain power legally, by parliamentary means, while repudiating parliamentarism, was a masterpiece of the first order. Adolf Hitler contrived to put an end to majority rule by a system from which majority rule is banned! Only a cultured and civilised people of the rank of the Germans could have done this. So the Nazi revolution is a laurel wreath in German history for ever and ever. Is not such a people called to the highest achievements in the history of humanity? In such a people must not the revolution be the beginning of a new and a greater Reformation? May it carry through this work!

* * *

In this spirit of confident faith Professor Bergmann's whole book is written. It is an essay on inherited virtues, German virtues,

Nordic virtues. Modern eugenics and doctrines of heredity, he thinks, give the answers to the questions which Odin, the all-knowing God, put to the Three Women Soothsayers. To achieve race-purity three measures must be taken—segregation, extinction and selection.

The first deed done to make Germany the formative land of a new mankind was accomplished in the spring of 1933, when the cleansing of the German folk from inferior elements, and its segregation against them, was begun. After the war Germany became a land of refuge for the lowest types of humanity. Not only the Socialists, but the Catholics, are responsible for having omitted everything that could foster a German rebirth.

The second and decisive measure for the regeneration of the German people was to sterilise, or to forbid marriage between, the unfit. It is far better to be humane before than after birth, despite the declaration of the Bavarian Cardinal Faulhaber that eugenic care for the race is incompatible with Christian morality. By taking care to prevent the birth of the unfit Germany is merely returning to the law of nature which ordains a pitiless struggle for existence. In the National Socialist State there is no such thing as an unlimited

right of individuals to reproduce themselves, for the individual is nothing, the folk is everything. Upon these preventive measures must follow measures of selection, so as to create a social aristocracy. Notions of human equality are dangerous nonsense, as Gobineau and Darwin showed. A thousand years of German history came to an end in the spring of 1933, and a new millennium dawned. In Hitler's Germany the will is growing to realise the social aristocratic State, such as Nietzsche foresaw; and this leads to the fulfilment of the twenty-fourth point of the National Socialist programme, which demands a "positive religion." Sociologically, the spirit of Christianity with its contempt for natural laws, with its equality of all men before a priest-made God, is the crassest contradiction of National Socialism. Nazism means not merely eugenics but aristogenics; and, for true Nazi Germans, the question arises: "Can we still be Christians?"

This question Professor Bergmann seeks to answer—after insisting that education to aristogenic thought must be the leading principle of female education, an education in which the instinctively passive behaviour of female animals must not be overlooked—by declar-

ing that whoever redeems men before they are born is a greater saviour than the friend of man, Jesus of Nazareth, and that Nazi Germans, while believing in God and in God's blossoming in noble human form, reject the heresy of Christian other-worldliness. They wish not merely to believe in a Christ, but each and all to be Christs. "We want to be redeemers, saviours and healers, according to our heroic ethics. We want to heal and redeem man before he is born, not before he dies."

Into the details of Professor Bergmann's aristogenic proposals it is unnecessary to enter, for they are not original. Their aim is to create a nobility of birth in place of a nobility of property and titles. He believes that Germans can gain ground, even without war, by their innate supremacy, and that there can be no truer, deeper, or more living religion than a religion of heroic formativeness of a race of men fairer than men have ever been. It is true that Luther rendered great service to a Germanic rebirth by freeing German Christianity from ecclesiastical Romanism, and by giving religion a Nordic Germanic character—though Luther's gift to the nation was dearly bought by his return to the Judaism of the

Old and New Testaments in which Nordic elements are lacking and Orientalism stands in the foreground. Adolf Hitler has now cleared the way for another rebirth. Yet his mighty deed can only bear full fruit when the Germans are one folk, in one realm, united in one faith. There is an evangel in German hearts. Is it not possible that, four centuries after Luther, true Germans should take refuge in it? Has not God so revealed Himself to the German spirit, to the people of Kant and Goethe, that they need not borrow their beliefs from Jewry? The Northern Word of God that lives to-day in thousands of German hearts, will help them to build up a second and a final Reformation.

* * *

The remainder of Professor Bergmann's work is an attempt to prove, from Scandinavian mythology and Nordic archaeology, that everything good in Southern culture and Southern civilisation was originally of Nordic or Atlantic origin, and that the biblical figure of Christ is merely a perversion of the original German Nordic God. The invention of other-worldliness is a symptom of spiritual disease, a sign of deep spiritual degeneration which, instead

of looking upon man and God as one and the same, separate man from God and destroy the Nordic Christ-ideal. The Christ of the Scriptures hesitated for a time between God and man, and finally decided to be God, thereby stamping man as an unholy creature, incapable of deifying himself—or, at any rate, this is how Christ's figure is made to appear. Jesus of Nazareth, who called himself "the Son of Man," would perhaps not have accepted this humiliation of humanity, or have allowed man to be divested of every trace of divinity by the Fathers of the Church. Before the Jewish-Roman Christianity of the Church Councils prevailed over the doctrine of Arius, the Goths, and probably also the Irish and Scottish Christians, held the Nordic Christian view; and even among Germans, in the era before Charlemagne, the heroic original form of the Atlantic Christ was held in honour, especially by the Bavarians. Were there to-day Germanic Christians, truly Germanic Christians, not such as cling to the non-German, Jewish-Roman Lutheran Christianity of the Bible, they would revive the old tradition and give the yearning for Christ its hallowed ancient Nordic form. Even Martin Luther, were he alive to-day, would certainly do so,

and take his stand on the Atlantic evangel, defying all the Popes of the world. He would say that, thousands of years ago, "the Word of God" was revealed to Nordic men in a form so pure and true that Germans surely have no need to borrow their faith from the East. And he would point to the Nordic runes of the God-Man and say: "This is our German Nordic God, the God who is true to type."

* * *

Thus Professor Bergmann preaches, in a form even more downright than that of Herr Rosenberg, Nazism as a religious faith. If it seems strange, heathen and barbaric, it cannot be brushed aside as of no moment, for it may not be far from becoming the official faith of Nazi Germany.

In the 'seventies and 'eighties of last century Bismarck opposed the Papal See, and was worsted, in a struggle known as the *Kulturkampf*, or a contest between different conceptions of civilisation. More fully than that of Bismarck, the new struggle between the conceptions on which Western civilisation has been founded and the Nordic "Aryan" religion of Herr Rosenberg and Professor Bergmann

seems to deserve the name of *Kulturkampf*. Upon its outcome the very future of Europe may depend. A comparison between the old *Kulturkampf* and the new will therefore be the subject of the next chapter.

THE NEW "KULTURKAMPF"

CHAPTER IV

THE NEW "KULTURKAMPF"

IT is one thing to use a foreign term, with or without an English translation, and quite another thing to understand it. The composite German word *Kulturkampf* is a case in point. To translate *Kampf* is simple. It means "struggle" or "fight." But to render the German conception of *Kultur* by one English noun is impossible. Even two nouns, such as "culture" and "civilisation," fail to cover its full meaning. Attempts to express in English some notion of what Germans understand by *kulturell* have debased our language with the pestiferous adjective "cultural," which conveys no precise impression at all. In defence of this horrid word it is sometimes urged that, since we say "agricultural" and "horticultural," we may properly say "cultural" when we speak of the tilth of the mind. My answer is that the things of the mind or spirit do not yield to the same sort of treatment as the growths of the soil; and that the German word *Kultur* connotes at once ideas that are vaguer and facts that are more concrete than those which we comprise in our

word "culture." On the other hand the English idea of "civilisation" does not imply the same concept, or series of concepts, as the idea of *Kultur* implies in German. So we are driven to paraphrase the German term in order to indicate the strange amalgam of related notions which it represents.

In the hope of finding a satisfactory definition of *Kultur*, and on the advice of a German friend, I turned to a work called *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, or *Observations on World-History*, by an eminent German-Swiss historian and philosopher, Jacob Burckhardt, who was for many years Rector of Bâle University. In his chapter on "Kultur" I find this passage:—

We call *Kultur* the sum total of those developments of the spirit which occur spontaneously and do not claim universal or compulsory validity. . . . Further, *Kultur* is the process that goes on in a million forms, and through which simple-minded racial action is transformed into reflected capability, nay, in its last and highest stages, into science and especially into philosophy, which is pure reflection.

Society, in the widest sense of the word, as distinguished from the State and Religion, is the outward comprehensive form of *Kultur*. Each one of its elements has, no less than the State or Religion, its own development, its own blossoming, decline

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and ulterior life in the general tradition (in so far as it is capable and worthy thereof). Countless factors also live on, even unconsciously, as acquisitions, contributions of peoples long forgotten which may have found their way into the blood of mankind. One must always take account of this unconscious adding-up of the results of *Kultur* in peoples and individuals.

This waxing and waning obeys higher and inscrutable laws of life.

At the beginning of all *Kultur* stands a mental miracle: languages, whose origin, independently of a single people and its speech, lies in the soul. Otherwise deaf mutes could not be taught to speak or to understand speech; only by the rising of the inner urge of the soul to meet it, the urge to clothe thoughts in words, is this possibility of teaching explicable.

* * *

Should this pellucid definition of *Kultur* still seem lacking in clarity to dull English wits, I fear I must give up the attempt to say what *Kultur* really is. One thing is abundantly clear—that the German conception of *Kultur* is neither simple nor susceptible of terse definition. Yet it has to be dealt with in one way or another, for it constantly impedes foreign efforts to comprehend German ways of thought and feeling.

But if we cannot easily say what *Kultur* is, we know at least what the *Kulturkampf* was. In 1850, after the revolutionary movements of the year 1848, Prussia adopted a Constitution and framed it on the model of the Belgian Constitution of 1848, which was itself an attempt to give written, and more or less logical, expression to English constitutional principles. By the Prussian version of this Belgian draft the Roman Catholic Church in Prussia was made almost independent of the State. One of its articles ran: "The Evangelical and the Catholic Churches, like all other religious organisations, settle and administer their affairs independently." Thus the Prussian Government gave up its former powers over the clergy; and, in particular, abandoned the "right to propose, nominate, elect and ratify" the appointment of priests and bishops, or to control the publication of ecclesiastical pronouncements and ecclesiastical correspondence with foreign countries. The clergy were entrusted with religious instruction in elementary schools, and retained their right to public honours and to the official protection of the ecclesiastical authority by the State. In effect the Constitution separated the Churches from the State, freed the clergy from lay control,

but allowed the clergy and their churches to remain recognised public institutions. As a result, the Catholic Bishops, with undisputed authority over the lower clergy, speedily acquired an influence that revealed itself in the formation of a Catholic, or Centre, political party.

The unexpected revelation of this influence alarmed and irritated the other Prussian political parties and the Prussian Ministers. After the establishment of the German Empire in January 1871 it was seen that the Catholic or Centre Party would play an important part both in the German Imperial Diet, or Reichstag, and in the Prussian Diet or Landtag. In Prussia the antagonism between the Centre and the other parties had begun before the establishment of the Empire. The non-Catholic parties had denounced the Catholics as "Ultramontanes" and as "enemies of the Empire," and compared them to the Hanoverian Guelphs and to the Socialists; and this political antagonism soon came to be called the *Kulturkampf* or "contest of cultures." The fight took the form of a long series of pronouncements and measures on the part of the Pope or of the German Catholic clergy, and of acts of repression on the part of the Prussian and the

German Imperial Governments. Both the Imperial and the Prussian Diets became theatres of embittered strife.

In 1870 the Vatican Council had adopted and proclaimed the dogma of Papal infallibility. On September 20, 1870, Italian forces had occupied the Papal States and Rome, thus destroying the temporal power of the Pope. A lively conflict had already begun over the position of the "Old Catholics" who refused to recognise the dogma of Papal infallibility or to submit to the dictates of Rome. A number of Roman Catholic professors of theology in German Universities, and of teachers of religion in the high schools, rejected the dogma of Papal infallibility, and were thereupon forbidden by their bishops to continue their teaching. Presently they were excommunicated. The German Government, declining to accept the decrees of the Vatican Council, refused to dismiss the excommunicated professors and teachers; and the Roman Catholic bishops, in their turn, protested against the Government in a joint address to the German Emperor in September 1871. The *Kulturkampf* thus became a conflict upon the extent of ecclesiastical powers over German Roman Catholic citizens.

Some months earlier, in February 1871, the Centre Party in the Prussian Diet, or Landtag, had put forward a demand for the restoration of the temporal power of the Pope; and, in the Reichstag, the Centre proposed that the articles of the Prussian Constitution which guaranteed religious freedom should be introduced into the German Imperial Constitution. Bismarck, the Imperial Chancellor, detested the Centre and especially its leader, a Hanoverian Guelph named Dr. Windthorst, and detested him the more because Dr. Windthorst supported the Polish Catholics of Posnania in their demand for the teaching of the Polish language to Polish children in the elementary schools.

Little by little the area of the conflict was widened. Catholic priests preached in the churches against the "Old Catholics" and against the Government which protected them. Against these priests the Bavarian Government proposed, and the Reichstag sanctioned in December 1871, the addition of a paragraph to the Imperial Penal Code so as to inflict the penalty of imprisonment on priests guilty of polemical or insulting political sermons. Meanwhile, in Prussia, the Roman Catholic clergy used their constitutional right of supervision over elementary education to remove "Old

Catholic" teachers from elementary schools, and refused the sacrament of marriage to "Old Catholic" laymen.

Thereupon the Prussian Government determined to restrict the powers of the clergy. It brought before the Diet bills to regulate the inspection of schools and the laws of marriage. But the Prussian Conservative party and the old Emperor William I, who desired to maintain both the influence of the Protestant clergy over the schools and the religious character of the marriage ceremony, disapproved of these bills, so that the only change which the Government could make was to transfer the supervision over elementary schools to lay inspectors.

In these circumstances Bismarck, who was at once Imperial German Chancellor and Prime Minister of Prussia, attempted to negotiate with Rome. But the Pope, Pius IX, declined to accept a liberal German Prince of the Church, Cardinal Hohenlohe, as Bismarck's representative. In a famous speech to the Reichstag, Bismarck then denounced the Pope and—alluding to the penance which Pope Gregory VII compelled an Emperor of Germany to perform at Canossa in the eleventh century—exclaimed: "Be without fear; to

Canossa we shall not go!" The Pope replied with a counter-denunciation of German persecution of the Church; and Bismarck's rejoinder was to persuade the Reichstag to sanction the expulsion from Germany of the Jesuits and of all their affiliated orders. When the Pope once more thundered against him, Bismarck withdrew the Prussian legation from the Vatican. Thus, in December 1872, there was a complete breach between the German Empire and the Holy See.

* * *

Bismarck's temper at this stage may be judged by a little-known episode of which I was told, many years ago, by one of the actors in it, the late Marquis Visconti Venosta, who was Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1873. When the Italian forces occupied Rome, in September 1870, Visconti Venosta had attempted to negotiate a settlement with the Vatican; and, on the failure of this attempt, had promoted the Italian Law of Guarantees which recognised the sovereign rights of the Papacy and protected the Vatican against external interference. Since the Vatican was surrounded on all sides by Italian territory, no foreign Power could subject the Pope to

physical constraint without crossing Italian soil. But in 1873 the King and Queen of Italy paid a visit to Berlin. Among the Italian Ministers who accompanied them was Visconti Venosta. To him Bismarck suggested that, if the Italian Government would shut one eye, Germany might send a couple of warships to an Italian port near Rome and march a naval force into the Vatican so as to bring the Pope to reason. At the risk of offending Bismarck, who was then the most powerful statesman in Europe, Visconti Venosta declined—and was thereafter looked upon in Berlin as a lukewarm friend of Germany.

* * *

In the German Empire and in Prussia the Roman Catholic clergy sided frankly against their temporal sovereign, the German Emperor, King of Prussia, and stood by the Pope as one man. But, after a Catholic workman had attempted in July 1874 to assassinate Bismarck, the Catholic clergy were treated as rebels. Bismarck prosecuted the bishops, dismissed and imprisoned several of them and seized their revenues. In order to put the Prussian clergy under the control of the State he persuaded the Diet to vote three series of

laws, known as the "May laws," in May 1873, 1874 and 1875. Under these laws the attempt was made to transform bishops and priests into State officials by requiring all candidates for the priesthood to study for three years at a German university, and to pass an examination in general *Kultur*, particularly in philosophy and history; and by obliging bishops to inform the Government of every ecclesiastical appointment they might make. These laws further ordained that no episcopal Sees or other church appointments should remain vacant, and empowered the State to supervise all Catholic seminaries. In 1874 the King-Emperor was at last persuaded to accept the institution of civil marriage in Prussia; and, in the following year, compulsory civil marriage was extended to the whole Empire.

Pope Pius IX, who was nothing if not a fighter, responded by an encyclical to the Prussian bishops in which he declared all these laws null and void, inasmuch as they were contrary to the divine constitution of the Church, and he congratulated the condemned bishops. The Government, on the other hand, demanded that bishops and priests should make a declaration of submission to the new laws, and suppressed all the salaries and

emoluments of bishops and priests who refused to make it. In 1875 the Prussian Diet rescinded the articles of the 1850 Constitution which had given independence to the churches, and dissolved all monasteries.

This done, Bismarck declared that "the armour of the State" was complete and that, in future, it would stand on the defensive. Thereafter the *Kulturkampf* consisted of protests and demonstrations on the part of Catholics and of the condemnation and dismissal of Catholic priests and laymen on the part of the Government. A number of episcopal Sees and Catholic parishes remained vacant; but the Centre Party, whose strength had been increased at the elections in 1874, went into systematic opposition—an opposition the more embarrassing to Bismarck since it compelled him to seek the support of the Prussian and German Liberals, whose ideas upon home policy he execrated.

Pope Pius IX died in 1878 and was succeeded by a pontiff of more liberal reputation, Leo XIII. Next year the Laws of Exception, which Bismarck had induced the Reichstag to pass against the German Socialists, came to an end, and Bismarck found himself confronted with a prospect of joint Catholic,

Socialist and, possibly, Liberal opposition. So he cast about for means of settling the conflict with the Vatican, dismissed the Minister who had been in charge of the *Kulturkampf*, and tried to open negotiations with Leo XIII. But the new Pope proved obdurate. It was a question of filling no fewer than six hundred parishes and episcopal Sees which had been left vacant; and as the "Laws of May" required from candidates a declaration which they felt they could not make, a compromise was found by persuading the Prussian Diet to give the Government power to dispense with this declaration. Thus the *Kulturkampf* ended. Between 1880 and 1893 all the punitive measures taken against the clergy were gradually withdrawn, save only the institution of civil marriage and the abrogation of the Articles in the Prussian Constitution of 1850 upon the independence of the churches. If Bismarck did not "go to Canossa," the impression prevailed that he had, at least, been wandering in the neighbourhood.

* * *

It is not my purpose to enquire whether the present strained relations between the Govern-

ment of Hitlerite Germany and the Vatican deserve to be called, or will develop into, a new *Kulturkampf* in the historic sense of the term. They may or they may not. Signs are not wanting to show that the would-be founders of a Nazi religion look upon, and are fain to treat, Roman Catholicism as a foreign and un-German faith, or that the Pope is disposed to resist what he has called "the new paganism" as stoutly as his predecessors resisted Bismarck. Nor is it necessary to record the phases of the struggle between the "German Christian Movement," which the Nazis have promoted, and the various Protestant Churches of Germany. Here again the position is too uncertain to warrant definite conclusions in the present, or a confident forecast of the future. Some features of Roman Catholic and Protestant resistance to "religious" Nazism are nevertheless noteworthy, among them being a sermon, preached last autumn by the Archbishop of Munich, Cardinal Faulhaber, in which this German Prince of the Roman Church offered his sympathy and encouragement to the anti-Nazi German Protestant divines and spoke of them as "our Protestant brethren." If such an expression has ever been used before by an exalted Roman ecclesiastic

when speaking of heretics, I am unaware of it. Adversity makes strange comrades.

Yet the series of Advent Sermons preached by Cardinal Faulhaber in the largest Munich church during December 1933, proves that the sturdy Cardinal is no mere opportunist. (These sermons have been published in English and are well worth reading.¹) At a moment when anti-Semitism and the agitation for an "Aryan" religion in Germany seemed to be at their height, the Cardinal-Archbishop chose as his subject the religion of the Jews, its relation to Christianity, and the influence of Christianity upon Germany. In one striking passage he made his standpoint clear:—

When racial research, in itself not a religious matter, makes war upon religion and attacks the foundations of Christianity; when antagonism to the Jews of the present day is extended to the sacred books of the Old Testament, and Christianity is condemned because it has relations of origin with pre-Christian Judaism; when stones are cast at the Person of Our Lord and Saviour, and this in the very year in which we are celebrating the centenary of His work of redemption, then the bishop cannot remain silent.

¹ *Judaism, Christianity and Germany.* Burns Oates and Washbourne.

After demonstrating the ethical, social and religious value of the Old Testament, Cardinal Faulhaber challenged directly the Nazi claim that the German people and "German Christians" must be purged of all "non-Aryan" elements; and he turned the tables on Nazi anti-Semitism by declaring: "Either we are disciples of Christ or else we relapse into the Judaism of antiquity with its hymns of hate." No less vigorously did he assail Nazi versions of German history. It is a fact, he said, for which Tacitus vouches, that the ancient Germans offered human sacrifices to their gods. In their forests and marshes they indulged in savage superstition such as was hardly to be found among any other people. Between themselves the Germanic tribes were in almost continuous conflict. Otherwise they were indolent, leaving all the agricultural labour to be done by slaves and women. Though it was forbidden to kill children once born, crippled or very poor children might be exposed and left to die. Of any civilisation, properly so-called, among the Germans of the pre-Christian period there could be no question.

It was through Christianity, Cardinal Faulhaber contended, that the Germans became a nation. Race and Christianity are not mutually

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opposed though they belong to different orders. Race means union with the nation; Christianity means primarily union with God. Hence there is no need to turn away from Christianity and to set up a Nordic or Germanic religion in order to foster nationality. "The best form of ancestor worship is to renounce all that is evil in one's forefathers, in our case the revengefulness, the indolence and the drunkenness of the ancient Germans, and on the other hand to accept as a sacred inheritance all that is good in them, in our case their loyalty, their pure conception of marriage and their reverence for women."

* * *

Whatever the outcome of the opposition of anti-Nazi German Protestants to Herr Hitler's Primate, Bishop Müller, and of that of the German Roman Catholics under the leadership of Cardinal Faulhaber, the deeper issue will remain whether the Nazi conception of *Kultur* is compatible with Christian views of civilisation. This new *Kulturkampf* involves an issue more fundamental than that of German ecclesiastical organisation, or even of German relations with the Vatican. Nazism is a modern form of barbaric paganism. When I read Herr

Rosenberg's and Professor Bergmann's expositions of what German "Aryan" faith should be in the twentieth century, I had a vague feeling that, long ago, I had seen something of this sort elsewhere. Gradually this feeling condensed itself into a precise recollection of Charles Kingsley's romance *Hereward the Wake* and of Longfellow's *The Saga of King Olaf*. So to these friends of my boyhood I turned for light upon the newest German faith, and not in vain.

Kingsley may not have been pedantically accurate as a historian, but he had sound knowledge of Saxon and Danish beliefs in England during the Dark Ages. And Longfellow's version of the Nordic saga of King Olaf is as "true to type" as Professor Bergmann's "Nordic God." They reveal the quality of the new *Kultur*—which the Western world discarded as barbarous nearly a thousand years ago—and show how drastically the prophets of Nazism would have Germany put the clock back and return to the outlook and the religion, the cult of violence and bloodshed, of the Northmen and Vikings in an age that seemed past and gone.

The first passage that recurred to my mind was the song of Hereward to Ranald, King of

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Waterford, on hearing that Leofric, Earl of Mercia and counsellor of Edward the Confessor (Hereward's reputed father) was dead. Here it is:—

Hereward, King, hight I.
Holy Leofric my father,
In Westminster wiser
None walked with King Edward.
High minsters he builded,
Pale monks he maintained.
Dead is he, a bed-death
A leech-death, a priest-death,
A straw-death, a cow's death,

Such doom suits not me.
To high heaven, all so softly,
The angels uphand him;
In meads of May flowers
Mild Mary will meet him:

Me, happier, the Valkyrs
Shall waft from the war-deck,
Shall hail from the Holmgang
Or helmet-strewn moorland.
And sword strokes my shrift be,
Sharp spears be my leeches,
With heroes' hot corpses
High heaped for my pillow.

At this outburst of heathenism, common enough among their half-converted race,

Kingsley explains, the Danes shouted with joy, for it was a time when monasticism made so utter a divorce between the life of the devotee and that of the worldling that it seemed reasonable enough for either party to have their own heaven and their own hell. "After all," Kingsley adds, "Hereward was not original in his wish. He had but copied the death-song which Siward Digre had sung for himself some three years before."

The challenge of the Nazi faith to our Western view of civilisation can hardly be more tersely put than in the opening stanzas of Longfellow's *Saga of King Olaf*. Three of them run :—

I am the God Thor,
I am the War God,
I am the Thunderer!
Here in my Northland,
My fastness and fortress,
Reign I forever!

.

Force rules the world still,
Has ruled it, shall rule it;
Meekness is weakness,
Strength is triumphant,
Over the whole earth
Still is it Thor's-day!

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Thou art a God, too,
O Galilean!
And thus single-handed
Unto the combat,
Gauntlet or Gospel
Here I defy thee!

* * *

Should we be tempted to think the rhapsodical utterances of Nazi prophets mere flights of imagination, without positive meaning in the contemporary world, a careful study of the appeal which Nazi literature has made to German youth will serve to check our scepticism and to foster reflection. This appeal needs to be judged in the light of the notions which Socialists and economists, in Germany and elsewhere, have for many years inculcated upon the young. The materialist interpretation of history, the belief that men and nations are ruled and guided mainly if not solely by the thought of material gain, have dried up the springs of imagination and tended to kill idealism. In many lands, not in Germany alone, this heresy had attained the rank and dignity of an orthodox philosophy, even in quarters which thought themselves free from any Socialist taint. Rightly to assess the

appeal of Nazism, full weight must be given to its psychological value, a value higher than that which any offer of direct personal advantage can possess, and ethically questionable chiefly because its inevitable results must be intolerance, violence and bloodshed.

The Nazi precepts of self-devotion, discipline and honour are not in themselves ignoble. Construed as symptoms of revolt against the sordid tenets of the "Manchester School," or the Marxist doctrines of the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat, their potency is undeniable. With the gloomy prophecies of Oswald Spengler, best known as the author of *The Decline of the West*, few sober thinkers will agree; but they may feel the force of one reminder in his essay on *The Reconstruction of the German Empire*: "It must always be borne in mind that politics come first and economics second in the lives of nations." And from a very different quarter, a thought-provoking book—*The End of Illusions*—by an able German-Jewish writer, Herr Leopold Schwarzschild, the following corroborative passage may be cited. After giving reasons for believing that, militarily and economically, Germany is thrice as strong as France, Herr Schwarzschild writes:—

The kernel of these fateful questions is the German military power. Illusions explode in the light of the fact that a German war apparatus is developing which, if things take their course, will soon be far mightier, absolutely and relatively, than was its predecessor in 1914. This fact of the military rebirth of Germany is for the present an incomparable source of future history.

It is true that this idea contradicts the materialist theory, for the materialist theory knows only one source of history—the economic. But never was it clearer than it is to-day that other things bear upon the lives of peoples and weigh in the balance at least as heavily and automatically as things economic. Questions of power may be such things, for the will to power is not less a material fact than the will to profit, and yearning for power is not always a subsidiary phenomenon of the yearning for gain. It can appear as an end in itself; and the German will to power to-day is, in high degree, of this quality.

If Herr Schwarzschild is right—and I, for one, think him right—we have to look upon the Nazi faith and the spirit with which it fills millions of young Germans, the Nazi outlook on life, or *Kultur*, which it bids them serve, as factors far weightier than matters of finance or the distribution of the profits of industry. We are in the presence of a deliberate and consistent attempt to put the might of the German nation—whose sons are being drilled and taught

skill in arms as never Germans have been drilled or taught before on anything like the same scale in time of peace—into the service of an ideal which is indistinguishable from German overlordship in Europe and presently in the world.

This it is that lends poignant interest to the new *Kulturkampf*, to the deliberate revival of the worship of Thor and Odin, with the equally deliberate attempt to bring whatever may be "heroic" in the Nazi conception of Christ into harmony with the Nordic sagas and legends by which Rosenberg, Bergmann and many others would fain replace both the Old Testament and the Christian Evangel. As regards the German Churches, Protestant and Catholic alike, the religious propaganda of Nazism is the more dangerous, because it does not carry with it the abolition of church or religion. The Hitlerite State wishes a Church or Churches still to exist, but to exist for the purpose of hallowing with ecclesiastical sanction political deeds of violence. Hence the significance of the "German Christian Movement" which has already made greater headway than those unfamiliar with Nazi Germany suspect.

The new *Kulturkampf* is, in reality, the conflict between this movement, with all that lies behind it, and the forces, within Germany and without, which are or may be ranged against it. This conflict is not religious or philosophical only. Sooner or later it may precipitate war. Early in May 1934 the following communication reached me from a well-informed quarter in Berlin:—¹

A fight is going on between what may be called "the Right" and "the Left" in the Nazi camp. On the Right stand the big industrialists, the most influential German financiers and the large landed proprietors, together with the Prussian military caste. On the Left stand the bulk of the Nazi Storm Troopers and Guards, who are supported by the smaller landowners and the smaller industrialists. They are led by the more revolutionary section of the party and especially by Captain Röhm, the Commander of the Storm Troops.

The Left desires the Nazi revolution to enter on a second phase and to carry through the Socialist part of its National Socialist programme; and, in view of the growing stringency of the economic crisis, the agitation against the Jews has been intensified in the hope of creating a diversion and of providing an outlet for revolutionary feeling.

But the Right is working by every means for

¹ That is to say, nearly two months before the "clean-up" of June 30th.

another diversion, for another outlet in war. Hence the intense preparation and propaganda for war. Herr Hitler's efforts to hold the balance even between the two tendencies, and not to take sides between Right and Left, seem to be doomed to futility. He will have to side with one group or the other, and upon his decision may depend the outcome of the struggle.

* * *

Commenting upon this information at the end of my lecture on May 23, 1934, I said that "If this account of the situation be accurate, as I have reason to think it is, the non-German world has cause to watch the course of events in Germany with the keenest attention. . . . If the Right should win, Europe may presently find that it has been chosen for an experiment in the virtue of the new German *Kultur*, the experiment being carried out with every resource of German science and industrial and military power. The new *Kulturkampf* may then become a physical fight to the death between two incompatible conceptions of civilisation.

"There remains, perhaps, and if there still be time, an alternative. This alternative is that those nations which believe in the superior virtue of a free civilisation, informed, directly

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and indirectly, by a Christian ethic, should stand together before it is too late, and make it quite clear that they are ready and able to defend their belief. Only the certainty that if the apostles of Nazi *Kultur* should challenge the culture and civilisation of other peoples by force of arms they would be exposed to invincible resistance and to dire retribution, seems likely to keep the new *Kulturkampf* within bounds. Yet, even in this uncertain eventuality, there would remain for the free peoples of the West a task to which they have not hitherto addressed themselves earnestly. This task is to put before mankind, and especially before the young, a new faith worthy of whole-hearted devotion and capable of combining whatever may be good in the illiberal systems of Bolshevism, Fascism and Nazism with respect for individual right and freedom and with progressive political forms."

The murderous victory of Hitler and the Right on June 30, and the following days speedily confirmed the accuracy of my information, and nothing that has since occurred or become known has invalidated the conclusions I drew from it. Week by week, if not day by day, the new *Kulturkampf* has been intensified, and proofs not only of the rapid re-armament

of Nazi Germany but of her warlike disposition have steadily accumulated. The danger to European peace is real, and may be imminent. To face and to provide against it betimes is thus the urgent duty of Western Governments and their peoples. But hardly less urgent is the need for a new liberal faith capable both of inspiring resistance to Nazi *Kultur* and of offering a more excellent way of national and individual life to bewildered minds. Such a faith must obviously be based on a sense of individual responsibility in and for freedom. Tentatively to define it will be the object of the concluding chapter.

RESPONSIBLE FREEDOM



CHAPTER V

RESPONSIBLE FREEDOM

BEFORE seeking to define responsible freedom it will be well to recapitulate certain principles already laid down. These are that ideas common to Russian Bolshevism, Italian Fascism and German Nazism challenge the foundations of Western liberal civilisation in so far as it is based on representative democracy and respect for individual rights and liberties; that a radical difference of view upon the character and functions of the State marks the line of cleavage between illiberal and liberal political systems and philosophies; and that at the root of modern illiberal systems lie, in one form or another, the doctrines of Hegel, whose exaltation of the State has been responsible for some of the most sinister developments in the history of Europe during the past century.

There is no common ground between a liberal outlook and Hegel's deification of the State Absolute. Though Hegel claimed that "freedom" was the starting-point of his theory of the State, his "freedom" turned out to be

State-directed conformity with the dictates of the State itself. Thus his conception of freedom was indistinguishable from the setting up of an absolute authority before which all individuals must bow; and, in the international sphere, it culminated in a justification of "preventive" or anticipatory war whenever the State or its head might think war expedient or profitable.

The liberal view of the State, on the other hand, is closely akin to that of President Masaryk, who regards the State as the instrument of a free people composed of individuals who freely give the highest service of which they are capable to their own community in the first place and, through it, to mankind at large. Such a State postulates self-government, which means collective and individual self-control, and a sense of responsible citizenship.

Not very different from Masaryk's view is that of the eminent Italian liberal philosopher, Benedetto Croce:—

What is true and sincere love of the State and of political life if not love of the field wherein the moral man labours and, with him, the man of thought and the artist, the field in which alone the joy of work is felt? One loves the State as one loves the place where one lives, the Nature that surrounds us, our family, our friends and companions who are

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all conditions and objects of activity that is at once congenial and dutiful. . . . To love the State is to work with the State, to put into the State and to pour into political life what is best in us, our feelings, the truths we think, that is, our active faith, our ideals; and it is this participation which, in other words, is called freedom. This freedom is not opposition to the State, an offence to its majesty, but is the very life of the State itself—unless we are ready to suppose that the blood circulating and renewing itself continually in our veins is lawless agitation against the sovereign calm of our physiological organism. Nor is freedom conceivable in the State unless it be political freedom to co-operate with its life; and theorists have laboured in vain to distinguish between the State and the freedom of individuals, between the spheres from which the State must exclude individuals and those in which it must respect them, circumscribing and restricting the spheres of freedom to the family or religion or science or art or all these together.¹

* * *

But the practical issue is how to translate into current, not to say popular, terms the truths which these philosophers set forth, so as to offer modern minds, and especially those of the young, a political faith worthy of their whole-hearted devotion. One thing is clear:

¹ *Orientamenti*, pp. 14-15.

self-interest alone or appeals to it can never inspire such a faith, nor can material considerations ennoble it. To suppose that they could was the gravest error alike of the Benthamite Radicals a century ago and of Marx's materialist interpretation of history. Bentham believed that mankind is made up of individuals who are, for the most part, incapable of obedience to any higher motive than grab; and James Mill, his chief disciple, scarcely thought otherwise. But James Mill's wiser son, John Stuart Mill, was persuaded that, in a self-governing democratic society, with freedom of opinion and opportunities for self-development, men would be capable of better things. To freedom of opinion he attached as much importance as does Mr. Bernard Shaw; and he would have seen nothing save poverty of spirit and contemptible weakness of will in any inclination to accept dictatorship. He was quite sure that self-government is better than "good" government imposed by authority, since men can only learn by experience and practice. In his view it is not solely or even mainly to form great thinkers that freedom of thinking is needed; it is needed quite as much in order to enable average human beings to attain the mental stature they are capable of.

There have been, he argued, and may again be great individual thinkers in a general atmosphere of mental slavery, but there never has been nor will be in such an atmosphere an intellectually active people.

Sturdy logician though John Stuart Mill was, he never belittled the value of faith or thought that "interests" alone could suffice as motives for political and social action. "One person with a belief is a social power equal to ninety-nine who have only interests," he wrote in his work on *Representative Government*; but he maintained equally that without economic freedom, political freedom cannot by itself cut the bonds of social servitude. With prescient condemnation alike of the doctrines of Bolshevism, Fascism and Nazism, he denounced the lust of power even more fiercely than the lust of money, for he thought unlimited power as harmful to those who wield as to those who are the objects of it. He wished men and women to become good, self-reliant citizens, fit to enjoy responsible freedom, fierce in their defence of it, gentle and tolerant in their use of it. Just as Masaryk's liberal philosophy is derived in part from Plato, so Mill's ideal of citizenship may be described in Plato's words—that the guardians of citizen freedom "should

be gifted with a passionate and also with a philosophical temper," or, as a Serbian proverb has it, that one should "fight for freedom like an archangel and, when it is won, live in it like a saint."

* * *

Goethe's maxim: "That which thy Fathers have bequeathed to thee, win it anew if thou wouldst possess it," is peculiarly pertinent to the present position. It should serve as a motto to us in these islands and to the whole British Commonwealth. Nor, in this great matter of preserving freedom, can Englishmen or Britons afford to think of themselves alone. Upon their example the fate of liberal civilisation may depend. They are the leading members of a world-wide organisation, partners in an experiment such as has never before been tried—an attempt to maintain cohesion between independent nations by the method of liberty and the absence of constraint. Should freedom vanish from Great Britain, should it be replaced by any form of dictatorial absolutism, Communist or Fascist, the British Commonwealth of Nations could not long endure, and the world would soon be "unfit for democracy." And should we cherish our freedom absent-

mindedly, taking it for granted as the air we breathe, we may find it and ourselves assailed from without much in the way in which, Herodotus declares, Xerxes the Persian planned to destroy the freedom of Athens and to conquer Greece. In words which, *mutatis mutandis*, Herr Hitler or Herr Alfred Rosenberg or Professor Banse might use of the British and the French, Herodotus thus explained the Persian monarch's motives:—

Once let us subdue this people, and those neighbours of theirs who hold the land of Pelops the Phrygian, and we shall extend the Persian territory as far as God's heaven reaches. The sun will shine on no land beyond our borders; for I will pass through Europe from one end to the other, and with your aid make of the lands which it contains one country. For thus, if what I hear be true, affairs stand: the nations whereof I have spoken, once swept away, there is no city, no country left in all the world, which will venture so much as to withstand us in arms. By this course then we shall bring all mankind under our yoke, alike those who are guilty and those who are innocent of doing us wrong.

I am indebted to Mr. Lionel Curtis, whose recent work *Civitas Dei* is a stimulating contribution to contemporary thought, for having drawn my attention to this passage. Between the pan-Persianism of Xerxes and the neo-pan-

Germanism of Hitler the analogy is striking; and it will appear more striking still in the light of the extract from *Mein Kampf* given in the first chapter:—

If, in its historical development, the German people had possessed the same herd-unity that stood other peoples in good stead, the German Empire would to-day be master of the globe. History would have taken another course; and who can say if this course would not have led to what so many purblind pacifists hoped to get by whining and whimpering; a peace not supported by the tearful, pacifist lamentations of palm-waving females but founded upon the victorious sword of a ruling race bending the world to the service of a higher *Kultur*.

Xerxes failed. Hitlerism, with its religion of the all-conquering "Aryan" Germanic sword, may fail. Herr Oswald Spengler, author of *The Decline of the West*, who holds that the future belongs to a new Caesarism, may be wrong. But we, who remain the foremost exponents of a political system founded upon individual freedom and individual responsibility, cannot afford to forget that the issue really lies between the principles of commonwealth and those of conquest. In his *Civitas Dei* Mr. Lionel Curtis expounds the principles of commonwealth as they developed in England

from Magna Charta onwards and gradually spread from these shores to other lands. He argues that the spirit of commonwealth is a constant, albeit constantly adjustable, compromise between freedom and authority. The first people who dared to question the principle of authority, he claims, were the Greeks, though their questioning of it was not solely negative. In reality they stood for Europe against Asia.

It is a curious fact, Mr. Curtis remarks, that the principle of absolute monarchy, which was first developed in Asia, mastered Europe for ages, whilst the principle of a commonwealth, which first sprang from Greece, is now profoundly affecting Asia. Absolutism, and the doctrine of divine right, dispose the minds of rulers and subjects alike to regard power over others as a good in itself, indeed, as the object of human existence. But progress in civilisation comes to a standstill when laws are held to be based on divine authority and not, as in the Greek view, on experience of facts apprehended and construed by human intelligence. The principles which govern human relations are grasped only when the task of applying them is thrown on to the shoulders of ordinary men; for true knowledge is gained in the

process of handling the facts of nature and life by an effort of the mind. Creative thought is denied to those who believe only what they are told.

The idea of absolute authority in the political sphere presumes—as Hegel, Hitler and the philosophers of Italian Fascism presume—that the ordinary man is incapable of learning what is best for himself in public affairs, and that his whole duty is one of obedience to rulers or leaders who possess this knowledge. And since independence of thought tends to impair the spirit of obedience, a system of authority naturally seeks to restrict freedom of thought and speech both in public and private affairs. Against such systems the commonwealth ideal, which stands for the sovereignty of law based on an independent reading of the facts by men who have acquired the faculty of making decisions for themselves and obeying them as laws, reveals itself as a progressive conception that is governed by one important reservation. This reservation is that the members of a commonwealth cannot be allowed only to obey the laws when each is willing to do so. Unless the unwilling are constrained to obey the law, the decisions upon which the law rests lose their effect. If

the commonwealth is to exist, it must therefore call upon those who recognise the duty of obeying the law to enforce it upon those who do not. The foundation of law is devotion, not force, but a commonwealth must use that devotion to enforce its laws.

* * *

This reasoning, which Mr. Lionel Curtis works out convincingly, implies a conclusion which he fails to draw yet which seems to me essential. It is that a true commonwealth must not only use the devotion of its members to enforce its laws, but that a commonwealth must deny to its individual members the right of being neutral in a contest between the law and the lawless. This principle of individual non-neutrality has been enshrined for centuries in the common law of England. It is the basis both of law and order in this country and of our freedom from illegal constraint. This does not mean that the whole duty of a citizen is made up of blind subservience to the law, for the community or commonwealth is composed of human beings, prone to err even in the things that most affect themselves. Hence, as Mr. Bernard Shaw points out, the importance of

freedom to criticise so that, when criticism of existing laws has commended itself to the minds of the community, the laws may be changed. Hence also the need for freedom of the press and of public meeting so that criticisms may be openly expressed and, if ill-founded, may be refuted.

But, as Mr. Lionel Curtis rightly argues, there have been and will be instances in which a loyal citizen finds a law so repugnant to his conscience that he feels bound to push his criticism of it to the point of setting it at nought, and of incurring whatever punishment it may prescribe for him, until such time as his fellow citizens perceive its wrongness. In the last resort a commonwealth stands or falls by the degree of its respect for freedom of conscience. Political and social progress in a commonwealth is often the result of a conflict between free consciences, obeying what they feel to be a higher than any legal injunction, and a law which has become or is becoming morally obsolete. The commonwealth rests on the principle that, when all is said and done, each man must decide for himself between right and wrong, and be ready to take the consequences of his decision; and the very purpose of a commonwealth is to render its members

fitter to take such decisions with a full sense of responsibility. Education in citizenship is the true object of the commonwealth, and the free exercise of that citizenship is a condition of a healthy existence of the commonwealth itself.

In our British Commonwealth we have gradually, though almost unconsciously, reached a compromise between the principle of authority, symbolised by the Crown, and the rights of free citizens represented chiefly in the legislature. By this process of compromise the descendants of the Norman and Plantagenet Kings have become the hereditary presidents of a British Republic in which the governed have the last word upon the goodness of their government. For the proper exercise of their function of criticism the governed need at once freedom and a sense of responsibility. History shows that good government cannot long continue unless it move towards self-government; but history also shows that self-government cannot long exist unless there is government in the real sense of the word. Mr. Curtis, for his part, claims that the factor which has enabled the English to build up a commonwealth on a national scale has been their instinct that government must not be

popularised to a point at which the system loses its governing qualities.

* * *

The difficult art of political freedom thus appears to demand a living, elastic system of checks and balances in which a working equilibrium is maintained by a strong sense that freedom is a positive good. Within limits, there is truth in Hegel's claim that it is false to look upon freedom negatively, or as being merely equivalent to the absence of constraint, and that positive freedom lies in self-determination by freedom of the will. Where Hegel goes wrong is in asserting that the free will is the will which wills to subordinate itself to the State, because the State possesses absolute authority; and he is still less right when he pretends that this freedom or self-determination of the will cannot be achieved by individuals on their own account but must be ensured by the State. Assertion for assertion, I prefer that of Rabindranath Tagore who declares: "We might have a possibility of the negative form of freedom, which is licence, before we can attain the positive form of freedom, which is love"; for Tagore looks upon "law as the first step towards freedom." This is

another way of putting Masaryk's aphorism that law, the ethical minimum—as distinguished from the ideal, or ethical maximum—is “the arithmetic of love.”

* * *

Now love is an emotion, a state of feeling, not an intellectual exercise; and, as an emotion, it is first cousin to faith. When we enter the domain of political action we rise—or fall—to an emotional plane and have to admit that we are dealing with factors or “values” that transcend, or lie deeper than, the purely mental. We may go farther and claim that, in all constructive political endeavour, thought and feeling go hand in hand, and that, while thought may guide, feeling supplies the motive power. And Mr. Lionel Curtis may be justified in saying readily: “No political science will furnish guidance in practical politics unless it proceeds from a definite conception of ultimate values.”

A younger thinker of a different school, Professor George E. G. Catlin, author of *The Principles of Politics*, reaches a conclusion not very different in his recent work: *Preface To Action*. Recognising, as does Mr. Curtis, that the whole concept of Western civilisation is, in

the main, derived from the Christian ethic, Professor Catlin doubts whether the Christian view of life and its meaning can profitably be banished from the drama of a new human world; for the Christian mythos seems to him substantially more profound than the notions of "the great tactician, Lenin." He is aware of all that Christianity has *not* done in well-nigh two thousand years, but he thinks that human kindness and unostentatious sacrifice still have their place as "values" in human society. He adds:—

However powerful and great a civilisation man builds, with health and good for all, there will never be a time when those who are full, who have forgotten humility, poetry, and understanding of sorrow, will be preferable, as human beings, to those who seek a more difficult perfection. It may well be that some measure of sacrifice is intrinsic in the very nature of civilisation. This statement, however, is all the heavens different from saying that most men should remain animated tools for the realisation of the civilised tastes of an elect few.

Some measure of sacrifice is, indeed, intrinsic in the very nature of civilisation; and, as the annals of human progress show, it is usually a sacrifice of sovereignty on the part of individuals or communities. The very existence of

law is a sacrifice, voluntary or enforced, of individual sovereignty in the interest of the greater freedom of the greater number from illegal and violent constraint. Both Mr. Lionel Curtis and Professor Catlin believe that, in our present stage of civilisation, national commonwealths or communities must sacrifice something of their individual sovereignties by fitting themselves into a rational framework of world organisation ; and in this they approach Masaryk's principle that, while nations are the natural units of mankind, the units themselves must be members of a greater whole.

* * *

Just as curtailments of individual sovereignty were stages in the march of mankind from the barbaric assertion of every man's freedom to do what he might think right in his own eyes to the acceptance of the rule of law as safeguarding a fuller measure of personal safety and freedom to law-abiding members of a community, so the present ideal of a higher civilisation involves the renunciation of freedom to use lawless violence internationally, and the sacrifice of some measure of sovereignty on the part of individual nations for the sake of peace. But the peace for whose sake these sacrifices

have to be made needs very careful definition if it is to be accepted as an ideal. I have long urged that the identification of "peace" with "non-war" is psychologically mistaken and practically inadequate; and I am glad to see that so earnest a thinker as Mr. Curtis agrees that the reason why peace, accepted as the supreme goal, fails as a principle of direction in policy, is inherent in the negative character of peace as it has been hitherto conceived. He believes that if we can once bring ourselves to look upon a world commonwealth as the aim of human endeavour we shall have a criterion by which to test all proposals: How far will they tend to increase our sense of duty one to another? In so far as they pass that test, Mr. Curtis is persuaded that economic and political problems will begin to find unexpected solutions. And, placing himself upon loftier ground, he claims that a policy which treats the avoidance of war as its final criterion is merely an attempt to apply, in the highest sphere of human relations, the injunctions of the Decalogue which Jesus of Nazareth rejected as obsolete. In the place of the ten prohibitions, Jesus—whom Mr. Curtis calls "the greatest thinker of all time"—laid down a positive and constructive duty. This was that men should

seek the good of others as though it were their own. If there be "no greater commandment than this," he observes, it will not suffice for nations to abstain from coercing each other by force. They must learn to think how, by steps slow, but patient and persistent, they can bring into being an order of society based on the duty of each to all, irrespective of national limits.

* * *

I have dwelt at some length upon the views of other writers in order to show that those who have thought deeply upon freedom agree in recognising that an element of faith, of belief in something that goes beyond material interests, must enter into any constructive political philosophy. No such philosophy can, in present circumstances, ignore the problem of war—and for a very simple reason. What shall it profit a man to ponder over this or that improvement in the political forms of human society when whole communities may be, and indeed are, in danger of utter destruction by modern warfare? Of what avail is personal or individual freedom if the very existence of free individuals and of free communities be threatened? A postulate of any sound philosophy or

of any humane political faith is to-day a definite, nay, a burning conviction that war as an instrument of individual national policy is incompatible with a free civilisation. This conviction seems to me the very essence of a dynamic liberal faith, not because war is horrible or destructive, but because it is a denial of reasonable and responsible freedom. This is not an issue which men can evade by declaring their abhorrence of armed strife to be so great that they will in no circumstances fight for King or country or for anything else. It needs to be faced and examined with an open-eyed fearlessness that does not shrink from the risk of having to fight and to die for what is held to be true and good.

Readiness to take this risk is the first condition of responsible freedom. If civilised mankind is to be set free from the fear of war, the individual citizens of civilised countries must be prepared to join in putting war for the promotion of selfish national interests effectively beyond the pale of international law. This cannot be done as long as the leading peoples of the world, who have renounced war by solemn treaty, think it possible to maintain neutrality towards a nation that may be guilty of the offence of warmaking. Otherwise

their unwillingness to renounce neutrality must invalidate their formal renunciation of war. No world commonwealth can be built up save on the established principle of English common law that there must be no neutrality on the part of individual citizens as between the upholders of the law and lawbreakers. The acceptance of this principle involves, in its turn, willingness and ability to join in penalising the lawless; for, as Mr. Stanley Baldwin has more than once reminded the House of Commons, we should not be honest with ourselves or with others did we undertake to join in punishing offenders without being ready and able to punish them. Nothing, he declared on May 18, 1934, could be a worse guarantee to the world or a more cruel deception of the people of this country than to say that we would guarantee peace by arms, and then not be ready to do so.

This matter goes to the root of the arguments frequently put forward in favour of an international police force as a safeguard against war, and it affects likewise the organisation of "regional pacts of security" against possible aggressors. If an international police force be looked upon as a means of lessening the commitments and the responsibilities of indi-

vidual countries, by recruiting and stationing, at a place or places to be determined, a body of armed men prepared to act wherever their presence may be required, the conception is at once illusory and impossible of realisation. But if it be admitted that the renunciation of war by international treaty restricts the lawful function of all armed forces to a police function, it follows that the co-ordination of those armed forces for the eventual discharge of that function would be both logical and necessary. Regional security pacts would then fall into their proper places as local expressions of an overriding universal principle of law; and they would cease to bear the odium that attaches to any and every arrangement for the "encirclement" of a potential aggressor. Save under the governing rule that the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy entails non-neutrality on the part of those who renounce it towards those who have recourse to it, there are no means of organising international police action or of safeguarding either individual communities or a world commonwealth against the unfreedom that is inseparable from selfish war and the waging of it.

Nor is the objection valid that acceptance of

the governing rule of non-neutrality must drag every nation into active meddling in every other nation's quarrels. English common law does not constrain individual citizens everywhere to rush to the scene where guardians of the law are upholding it against the lawless. But it does constrain them not to abet, aid or comfort the lawless by active or passive support. All members of an effective world commonwealth would be subject to a similar obligation in regard to war-makers. Whether or not a member would be called upon to show forcible, as distinguished from economic and financial, non-neutrality towards war-makers would depend upon the nature and extent of the police action required.

* * *

Thus, in the affairs of nations, the first article of a dynamic liberal faith is willingness, coupled with readiness, to sacrifice the sovereign right of neutrality in order to redeem law-abiding mankind from the lawless violence which is war. This article denies the thesis, long upheld by Prussian and other apologists for violence, that might, in the form of superior armed strength and irrespective of the lawful-

ness of its use, can create right. The denial of this thesis is warranted by the distinction, which Masaryk draws, between legal might and arbitrary violence, and by the cogent argument, which Mr. Lionel Curtis repeats, that members of a community, national or international, cannot escape constraint if they set at nought laws which the community has adopted. To ignore this distinction and this argument is to give a charter of licence to all who, for their own reasons, may wish to defy the law. Where there is freedom of opinion, freedom to express opinion in the form of criticism, and freedom of appeal to a court of law, the possibility remains open of changing the law by consent whenever it is found to be susceptible of just amendment. And as, in English constitutional practice, the maxim applies that "the King's Government must be carried on," so it is a condition of individual freedom among responsible members of a national or international community that, pending repeal or amendment, the law shall prevail.

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Once we have reached a conviction that international lawlessness, in the form of war,

shall be classed as piracy and treated accordingly, we shall approach the stage of considering whether other forms of selfish international strife ought not equally to be condemned as being equivalent to warfare by non-violent means. Such forms of strife are chiefly economic. The old liberalism, which has lost the allegiance of so many modern minds, pinned its faith to what Marx and Engels called, in their Communist Manifesto of 1848, "a pitiless freedom of trade"—a freedom in which the economically stronger took advantage of the economically weaker. Now, partly in defence against "this freedom," nations the world over have not only set up tariff barriers against each other but have taken protective measures in which rampant nationalism, inspired by another sort of economic selfishness, has brought many peoples to the verge of penury. Into this economic nationalism two principal factors enter—the desire for wealth and prosperity on the one hand, and, on the other, in view of the weighty function of industry in the waging of modern war, the desire not to be caught unprepared and undefended for lack of industries capable of serving as means of national defence.

The first of these desires is comprehensible

and, within limits, justifiable. No nation can be expected to leave the well-being of its own citizens at the mercy of foreign producers and merchants. In this respect the old ideal of "free trade" is dead, and the narrower liberalism which clings to free trade as to a dogma is likewise dead or dying. But when measures of defence are transformed into economic weapons of offence, by under-selling, dumping or otherwise, there grows up a state of economic war that is wholly incompatible with the ideal of an international commonwealth.

As regards the second factor in economic nationalism—the desire to possess national industries susceptible of rapid conversion to war purposes—it is clear that the need for such industries, and for the economic barriers and subsidies which protect them, would become less and less urgent in proportion as war itself were so effectively outlawed as to be dismissed from men's minds as a likely contingency. Then economic barriers of this kind would tend to disappear, and the exchange of commodities between nations would cease to be hampered by these artificial restrictions. At this point and to this extent the connection between warfare by arms and warfare by impediments to trade becomes perceptible. The more reason,

therefore, for those who would establish economic peace to abolish warfare by arms.

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Side by side with the international economic problem stands, in every highly-organised community, a social and economic problem which consists mainly in securing a better distribution of wealth and of the fruits of labour. To this problem sociologists, economists, and especially Socialists and Communists, have long addressed themselves without finding either an agreed solution of it or reaching common ground for the study of it. Some, like the Marxists, recommend the violent expropriation of the possessing classes (or the "haves") by the non-possessing classes (the "have nots" or proletarians) and the setting up of a dictatorship of the proletariat. An attempt thus to solve the social problem has been made in Soviet Russia with results which I shall not essay to appraise beyond saying that their excellence is not as yet universally held to be such as to warrant other communities in repeating the Russian experiment. In any event this experiment has been and is marked by the most drastic methods of social,

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intellectual, political and economic unfreedom, not to say downright tyranny.

Against the Russian Bolshevik, or Communist theory and practice, the possessing classes in some other countries have welcomed or tolerated different forms of unfreedom such as Fascism and Hitlerism. The adoption of these forms has been preceded or accompanied by the spreading of doctrines which I have expounded and illustrated. And it is no mere coincidence that the Fascist and Nazi systems, at any rate, extol militarism and proclaim the rightfulness of war as a means of promoting national interests.

But the most remarkable feature of the processes which have led up to the establishment of these forms of violent unfreedom has been the weakness of the resistance they have met with. And if, in the cases of Fascism and Nazism, we look for an explanation of this weakness, we may perhaps find it in the steady undermining of liberal faith by political and economical teachers who would have men believe that they live by bread alone and that the economic factor is always and inevitably the governing factor in human life. The materialist interpretation of history, which Marx and Engels derived from Hegel, who

was himself an apostle of unfreedom, has so enfeebled belief in the higher political truths to which the pioneers of liberal thought were passionately devoted, that liberal thought itself has fallen into abeyance if not into discredit. There can be no responsible freedom for self-governing men in free commonwealths unless this materialist heresy be abjured, and the rights of man, as a human being, be given precedence over merely economic or financial considerations.

This is not to say that material factors do not enter largely into any sound political faith and philosophy. There is a strident contradiction between the full political citizenship which members of self-governing communities still enjoy, and the condition of economic dependence in which the great majority of these same political citizens have perforce to live. If democracy be thought the highest, as it is assuredly the most difficult, political system, it ought to be evident that equality in political citizenship must work out its economic consequences, and that it is futile to generalise upon spiritual "values" below a decent level of subsistence. And here we come to the crux both of the social question and of the economic aspects of any truly liberal faith.

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This issue can only be met by asking what the purpose of liberal civilisation may be. Is it to create better and more efficient machines, producing wealth for their owners without improving the quality of human life, or is it to render life fuller, freer, more worthy and more responsible? My own belief is that unless the claims of productive human work, by brain or hand, be deliberately accepted as superior to those of material wealth, either in the form of capital or of finance or in that of the ownership of machinery, there can be no liberal faith. Capital and wealth are indispensable agencies of production, entitled to fair remuneration for their use, but not to absolute power over the lives of men. Once the fair rent of capital has been paid, care for the quality of human life demands that the surplus value shall be fairly distributed among the human producers, not in a spirit of charity or even as a sort of social insurance but in recognition of the superior right of human beings to the rewards of human labour.

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From whatever angle the problem of free civilisation be approached, it reveals itself as a problem of law-abiding helpfulness *versus*

lawless force. The ideal of international peace, negatively conceived as non-war, cannot inspire the ardour or kindle the faith of the young, because it is compounded of fear—fear of loss, fear of suffering, fear of death. We need a conception of peace that is compounded of courage, and takes active helpfulness among free men as its method. We need to think of it as an adventure so high and noble, so full of worthy risk as to enlist the energy and command the allegiance of youthful hearts. So with social peace. Social strife, with its waste and rancour, its sordid efforts to retain or to grab material advantages, is a poor substitute for love of our fellow men. In each case the truly liberal ideal is a reflection of the Christian ethic. Between this ideal and those of Communism, Fascism or Nazism the gulf is too wide and deep to be readily spanned, as wide and deep as the gulf between the spirit of helpfulness in responsible freedom and the spirit of discipline and conformity under tyrannical constraint.

Soon or late mankind will have to decide which ideal it will pursue, and those who choose the liberal ideal may have to pledge their lives to uphold it. This ordeal they will escape only if they resolve betimes to leave no doubt of their readiness and ability to prevail

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by creating an overwhelming superiority of law-abiding strength against partisans of the rule of lawless force. Otherwise they will have to fight without the assurance of success, if not in despair. I, for one, believe in the triumph of a liberal faith, inspired by fidelity to responsible freedom, if that faith be passionately held and be vindicated at whatever cost or sacrifice of individual or national sovereignties its victory may demand.